The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy by Bartrum, Ian C
The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy 
Abstract 
 
This article builds on Philip Bobbitt's Wittgensteinian insights into constitutional argument 
and law.  I examine the way that we interact with canonical texts as we construct arguments in 
the forms that Bobbitt has described.  I contend that these texts serve as metonyms for larger 
sets of associated principles and values, and that their invocation usually is not meant to point 
to the literal meaning of the text itself.  This conception helps explain how a canonical text's 
meaning in constitutional argument can evolve over time, and hopefully offers the creative 
practitioner some insight into the kinds of arguments that might accomplish this change. 
 
I offer three examples, each organized by: (1) the argumentative modality within which the 
text most often appears; (2) the type of evolution the text's meaning has undergone; and (3) 
the predominant sphere of constitutional discourse in which the evolution has taken place.  
The first example—Thomas Jefferson's Reply to the Danbury Baptists—appears in the 
historical modality, and is an example of "decanonization" accomplished in the Supreme 
Court.  The second, Lochner v. New York, appears in doctrinal argument and exemplifies 
"canonical refinement" within the legal academy.  The Declaration of Independence and the 
Gettysburg Address are my final examples; they appear in the ethical modality, and illustrate 
"canonical reformation" within the sphere of constitutional politics.  Along the way, I hope 
that my historical narratives shed perhaps a little light on old and familiar stories. 
 
I do not intend to forward much of a normative interpretive theory here, beyond pointing to 
Wittgenstein's generalized assertion that meaning can best be found in use.  Indeed, I believe 
this approach is in keeping with the central and illuminating Wittgensteinian insight that 
Bobbitt has brought to constitutional law.  That is, there are no “right” answers to many 
constitutional questions; there are no foundational kinds of definitions for the most 
controverted constitutional terms, which we might discover if only we could hit upon the 
correct interpretive theory or algorithm.  All that we have is the constitutional conversation 
itself—this discussion and its derivative decisions are, in fact, the constitution—and the only 
meanings we can attach to disputed terms are those that we can discover by looking to their 
proper use.  It is nonetheless true that such a descriptive project is also, by necessity, a 
historical project, complete with its own kinds of interpretive decisions and normative 
judgments.  But my aim here is at a particular kind of history—an "argumentative" history, 
for lack of a better phrase—which explores the appearance and construction of canonical texts 
within particular arguments, and tries generally to avoid taking a position on the merits of 
substantive claims.  In the end, I conclude that constitutional argument—like art—is better 













It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical 
propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such 
empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this 
relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions became hardened, 
and hard ones became fluid. 
 
      Ludwig Wittgenstein1 
 
In recent years, the constitutional canon has been a subject of growing interest and 
controversy among theorists as notable and diverse as Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, Sanford 
Levinson, Philip Bobbitt, William Rich, Richard Primus, and Suzanna Sherry.2  The thought, 
crudely put, is that there are certain texts apart from the Constitution—some are directly 
derivative, others are not—which resound so powerfully in our constitutional ear that they 
have hardened, in incompletely defined ways, into part of the fundamental law itself.3  This 
idea, in all of its permutations, is profoundly important for constitutional lawyers, particularly 
as our constitutional culture continues to quake, erupt, and reform along unforeseen and 
unforeseeable technological and communicative fault lines.  After all, it is largely through the 
ongoing construction and reconstruction of the canon—the reconfiguration of Wittgenstein’s 
“fluid” and “hardened” propositions—that we accomplish modern constitutional reform; or 
something akin to the five-staged “constitutional moments” that Ackerman has so insightfully 
identified.4  And, as our discourse evolves to incorporate terms like “superprecedent”5 and 
                                                 
* Irving S. Ribicoff Fellow, Yale Law School.  Many thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Reed Amar, Diego 
Arguelhes, Jack Balkin, Or Bassok, Philip Bobbitt, Jules Coleman, Christopher Essert, John Greabe, Philip 
Hamburger, Leslie Harris, Stephan Jaggi, Paul Kahn, Mark Kende, Jed Kroncke, Anthony Kronman, Robert 
Post, Aziz Rana, Seth Barrett Tillman, and participants in the Yale Law School Multidisciplinary Forum for 
conversations, comments, and ideas related to this project. 
1 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 15, #96 (Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe, trans., Harper 1972). 
2 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1750 (2007); Jack Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 999 (1998); Philip Bobbitt, The 
Constitutional Canon, in LEGAL CANONS 331 (Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, eds. 2000); William Rich, 
Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
153, 199 (2002); Richard Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L. J. 243 (1998); Suzanna 
Sherry, The Canon in Constitutional Law, in LEGAL CANONS 374 (Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, eds. 2000). 
3 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at  
4 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 20 (1998). 
5 See Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in “Superprecedent”?, N.Y. TIMES [section] 4, at 1 (Oct. 30, 2005). 
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“landmark statute,”6 it is critical that we continue to work towards a coherent theory of the 
canon and its function in constitutional practice. 
My admiration for Philip Bobbitt’s modal theory of the Constitution—which posits six 
legitimate “modalities” of constitutional argument7—is on record, and so it is perhaps 
unsurprising that I am drawn to his attempt at a modal catalogue of canonical texts.8  And 
although I conceive of this project as in keeping with Bobbitt’s original Wittgensteinian 
insight,9 my approach to the relationship between the constitutional canon and the 
constitutional modalities is different than that which he has taken.  While Bobbitt identifies 
particular canonical texts as exemplars of the different modalities of argument,10 my purpose 
here is to explore the ways that we use these texts to help make modal arguments and 
decisions within the practice of constitutional law.  I thus take Bobbitt’s opening insight—
“[t]exts may speak, but they do not decide”11—as the starting point of an account that sees 
many canonical texts employed as metonyms for larger constitutional principles or concepts.  
I borrow an idea from language theory, as does Bobbitt’s modal account, because law, like 
language, is a practice; an interactive communicative enterprise that legitimizes particular 
acts or utterances based on their usage and acceptance within a specific community and 
context.12  It is, in other words, impossible to say what McCulloch v. Maryland (for example) 
“means” in absolute terms; rather, to understand that text’s constitutional significance we 
must look to how it is used in the constitutional conversation.  To this end, I hope that the 
                                                 
6 See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 125 (2008) (discussing the “shift from formal amendment to landmark statute” in the 
context of the civil rights struggle). 
7 See, e.g., Ian Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations of Bobbitt’s Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. 
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 157 (2008).  Bobbitt has theorized that it is the form or modality of a constitutional 
argument that determines its legitimacy.  He identifies six legitimate argumentative modalities: historical, 
textual, doctrinal, structural, prudential, and ethical.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-
13 (Basil Blackwell, 1991). 
8 Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 332-56. 
9 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 5, 123 (Oxford Univ. Press, 
1982).  Bobbitt’s insight is Wittgenstenian in that he argues that constitutional meanings are embedded (and only 
comprehensible) within the practice of constitutional argument.  It is, in other words, impossible to say what a 
constitutional provision means in the abstract; rather, we can only usefully identify meanings in context as we 
apply the modalities of argument to make concrete constitutional decisions. 
10 See Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 332. 
11 Id. at 331. 
12 For a theoretical account of language in these terms, see generally, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans., 3d ed., 1958) (positing a theory of reference based partly on correct 
usage within particular language-games). 
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concept of constitutional metonyms can help illuminate the ways that we both use and 
recreate the canon as we build constitutional arguments and make constitutional decisions. 
Accordingly, this paper does not attempt to justify a list of the most canonical texts in 
constitutional law, nor do I argue that we should treat certain cases or statutes as 
constitutional amendments accomplished outside of the Article V process.  Rather, I explore 
the ways that we use canonical texts when we make the kinds of constitutional arguments that 
Bobbitt has identified.  I have thus tried to choose texts that most lawyers would agree are 
either canonical or “anti-canonical”13—I contend here that the canon and the anti-canon serve 
the same metonymic function in our practice—in the hope that a few specific illustrations 
might provide a sufficient model from which to extrapolate the theory I propose.  That theory, 
succinctly put, is that a canonical text serves as a placeholder—a metonym—for a larger set 
of associated ideas or principles;14 and, further, that this larger set of ideas is not always 
entirely consistent with the original meaning of the particular text.  Thus, a canonical text 
takes on its own metonymic meanings—sometimes quite apart from its literal textual 
meaning—within the practice of constitutional law.  Indeed, it is largely the power and utility 
that a text has as a metonym for larger values within our modal practice that determines 
whether, and how, we accept it as canonical.  Canonical texts, which we might see as having 
“hardened” in the Wittgenstenian sense, make up the channels through which more “fluid” 
propositions of constitutional meaning then flow.  But precisely because these texts function 
as metonyms—not as narrow or literal statements of law—their propositional content will 
change as the associated concepts they connote are realigned within constitutional culture and 
practice.  It is thus ever a two-way street: the canon channels the practice, but, in turn, the 
practice reshapes the canon.  And, of real significance for practitioners, a deeper 
understanding of these processes may provide more sophisticated tools with which to exercise 
long-term influence on constitutional meanings.   
With this in mind, I have organized the examples below along three separate axes.  
First, I locate each illustration within a particular constitutional modality; that is, I identify the 
form of argument that canonized the particular text.  Thus, the Gettysburg Address, which 
                                                 
13 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 1018-19 (discussing the formation of an “anti-canon”); accord 
Primus, supra note 2, at __. 
14 Professors Balkin and Levinson make—though do not much explore—a similar point in their discussion of the 
canon as “examples.”  Id. at 992.  They even go so far as to label some canonical arguments “synecdoches,” 
although I think the broader trope (metonym) is more precisely applicable.  Id.   
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appears in the final section, makes up a part of the ethical canon: it is a product of Lincoln’s 
ethical argument about constitutional meaning, and it is now among those texts a practitioner 
can use—or at least must account for—as she constructs constitutional arguments rooted in 
the ethos of American democracy.  I do not mean to suggest that a canonical text can only 
appear in one modality of argument—indeed I have argued elsewhere that some of the most 
important moments of constitutional evolution result from the overlap of modal 
arguments15—but I do contend that each piece of the canon has a modal home, so to speak, 
where it is best and most comfortably employed.  Second, I have tried to choose examples 
that illustrate three distinct categories of evolution in metonymic meaning.  My first example 
demonstrates the process of decanonization, in which a text is washed out of the constitutional 
riverbed and carried away downstream; the second illustrates the process of canonical 
refinement, in which a text’s metonymic meaning is distilled as it assimilates into a changing 
constitutional culture; and the third exemplifies the process of canonical reformation, in 
which a text assumes—or reassumes—vital and significant metonymic meanings.16  Finally, I 
identify the predominant sphere of constitutional discourse within which the relevant changes 
in metonymic meaning have taken place: in my examples the respective spheres are the Court, 
the legal academy, and constitutional politics.  By organizing the examples in this way, I hope 
to offer practitioners a descriptive model of canonical (thus constitutional) change 
accomplished within the existing modalities of argument, which may alert creative advocates 
to valuable new methods of craft. 
Those looking for a normative kind of thesis in this piece will, I fear, be disappointed, 
as this is a decidedly descriptive project.  Indeed, this approach is in keeping with the central 
and illuminating Wittgensteinian insight that Bobbitt has brought to constitutional law.  That 
is, there are no “right” answers to many constitutional questions; there are no foundational 
kinds of definitions for the most controverted constitutional terms, which we might discover if 
                                                 
15 Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities, supra note 7, at 168. 
16 It might be helpful here to think of the canon in terms of another, non-geological, analogy.  Imagine canonical 
texts as argumentative boundary stakes, which roughly describe the path a competent practitioner must travel 
within a particular modality.  Attached to these stakes are a number of metonymic meanings, which further 
define the contours and scope of acceptable argument.  In decanonization the stake and all its meanings are 
simply uprooted and carried away, perhaps to appear again somewhere else.  In canonical refinement one or 
more metonymic meanings are detached from the stake, which remains in place.  And in canonical reform a 
significant new (or renewed) meaning is attached to the original stake, which dramatically alters the shape of the 
practice.  It is certainly no accident that these processes roughly correspond to the familiar doctrinal practices of 
repudiating, distinguishing, and extending common law precedent. 
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only we could hit upon the correct interpretive theory or algorithm.  All that we have is the 
constitutional conversation itself—this discussion and its derivative decisions are, in fact, the 
constitution—and the only meanings we can attach to disputed terms are those that we can 
discover by looking to their proper use.17   That is my purpose here, to describe evolutions in 
the use—and thus the meaning—of canonical texts in constitutional argument, and to thus 
identify ways that we can influence and adapt constitutional meanings over time through 
particular uses of modal argument.  It is nonetheless true that such a descriptive project is 
also, by necessity, a historical project, complete with its own kinds of interpretive decisions 
and normative judgments.  But my aim here is at a particular kind of history—an 
argumentative history, for lack of a better phrase—which explores the appearance and 
construction of canonical texts within particular arguments, and tries generally to avoid taking 
a position on the merits of substantive claims.  Along the way, I do also hope that I may tell 
old stories anew, and reinvigorate familiar historical narratives.  As for normative 
constitutional theories, a priori definitions, and interpretive algorithms, however, I am content 
here to pass over them in silence.  With that said, I hope the illustrations below can help to 
clarify the concept of canonical metonyms and their importance to the practice of 
constitutional law. 
 
I. HISTORY: THE SUPREME COURT, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S WALL OF SEPARATION, 
AND DECANONIZATION 
 
The Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states in the 
1947 decision Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, which upheld a New Jersey 
program that reimbursed parents for the costs of public transportation to both public and 
parochial schools.18  At the rhetorical center of Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion was a 
phrase taken from Thomas Jefferson’s reply letter to a group of dissenting Connecticut 
Baptists: “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was 
                                                 
17 See WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12, at 20, (#42) (“The meaning of a word is its use in the 
language.”). Indeed, Wittgenstein might have agreed that, like philosophical problems, our deepest constitutional 
dilemmas arise when our constitutional grammar “goes on holiday”; when we try to assimilate the use of one 
kind of term to a discussion of a different kind, or when we try to understand a term in isolation from the 
contexts in which it is normally employed.  See id. at 19, (#38). 
18 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).  Some of the material and ideas in this section first appeared 
in, Ian Bartrum, Of Historiography and Constitutional Principle: Jefferson’s Reply to the Danbury Baptists, 51 
J. OF CHURCH & STATE ___ (2009).  They are used here with the permission of the Oxford University Press. 
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intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state.’”19  From this moment of 
constitutional canonization, the symbolic wall would feature prominently in many of the 
establishment decisions handed down over the next half century, but surprisingly little 
attention has been paid to the actual history or context of Jefferson’s letter.20  While this 
circumstance is perfectly consistent with a metonymic understanding of the canon, it is 
important for my descriptive purposes here to begin with some contextual account of the 
letter’s original or literal meaning. 
The story of the Danbury letter begins at least as far back as the bitterly contested 
presidential election of 1800, in which Jefferson defeated incumbent Federalist John Adams.21  
As part of a vigorous smear campaign, the Federalist press used Jefferson’s decades-old 
remarks about religious freedom in Virginia—including his infamous claim that the worship 
of “twenty gods or no god.…neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg”22—to brand him a 
Deist, or worse, an Atheist.23  In the Connecticut Courant, the pseudonymous “Burleigh” 
gladly paraded the various horribles that Jefferson’s views might entail: 
The doctrine is this—that if a man believes in the rectitude of murder, 
atheism, rape, adultery, etc., it is of no importance, because it neither 
breaks our legs or picks our pockets; and as long as our pockets and 
legs are safe, government is satisfied.24 
 
Even after the campaign, Federalists continued to lament the election of the “howling 
atheist”25 whose supposed predilection was “to eradicate every principle and efface every 
vestige of the Christian religion.”26  And of particular concern in New England was 
Jefferson’s refusal (as President) to make official proclamations or prayers of thanksgiving on 
traditional days—indeed, the Massachusetts Columbian Centinel had earlier suggested that, in 
                                                 
19 Id. at 16. 
20 See Bartrum, supra note 15, at ___. 
21 For a provocative account of the vagaries of the 1800 contest, see Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Jefferson and the 
Election of 1800: A Case Study in Political Smear, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 467 (1948). 
22 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 170 (J.W. Randolph, ed. 1853). 
23 See, e.g. “A Letter to A Friend,” CONNECTICUT COURANT (August 18, 1800); accord Thomas E. Buckley, 
Reflections on A Wall, 56 WM. & MARY Q. 795 (1999). 
24 Burleigh, “To the People of the United States,” CONNECTICUT COURANT (July 7, 1800), at 3. 
25 See RICHARD J. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION:  1775-1818 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1918) (quoting 
Connecticut clergyman Thomas Robbins’ diary entry, “I do not believe the Most High would permit a howling 
atheist to sit at the head of this nation”). 
26 Lucius, “Letter,” WASHINGTON FEDERALIST, (Feb. 10, 1801), at 2; accord Constance B. Schulz, “Of Bigotry in 
Politics and Religion”: Jefferson’s Religion, the Federalist Press, and the Syllabus, 91 VIRGINIA MAGAZINE OF 
HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 73, 82 (1983). 
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Virginia, a Governor “in his public addresses may openly ridicule the Christian Religion, or 
deny the excellence of God, without punishment or impeachment.”27 
 A year into his presidency, these “slanders and slanderers” still stung Jefferson, who 
vehemently denied that he meant to encourage a “government without religion,”28 and he 
actively sought an opportunity to explain himself to his detractors in the North.29  He got his 
chance when a committee of Baptist dissenters from Connecticut—who saw Jefferson as a 
potential ally in their struggle against the Congregationalist state establishment—sent the new 
President a letter of congratulations.30  The Baptists’ letter, drafted in October of 1801, did not 
reach the White House until the last days of December,31 but when it did finally arrive he 
undoubtedly welcomed the passage on religious freedom: 
Our sentiments are uniformly on the side of Religious Liberty—That 
religion is at all times and places a Matter between God and 
Individuals—That no man ought to suffer in Name, person or effects 
on account of his religious Opinions—That the legitimate Power of 
civil Government extends no further than to punish the man who 
works ill to his neighbor.  But Sir, our [Connecticut] constitution is 
not specific.  Our ancient charter, together with the Laws made 
coincident therewith, were adopted as the Basis of our Government, at 
the time of the revolution; and such had been our Laws and usages, 
and such still are; that religion is considered as the first object of 
Legislation: and therefore what religious privileges we enjoy (as 
minor part of the state) we enjoy as favors granted, and not as 
inalienable rights: and these are inconsistent with the rights of 
freemen.  It is not to be wondered at therefore; if those, who seek after 
power and gain under the pretense of government and Religion should 
reproach their fellow men—should reproach their chief Magistrate, as 
an enemy of religious Law and good order, because he will not; dares 
                                                 
27 Decius, “The Jeffersoniad No. IV,” COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (July 9, 1800) at 1 (emphasis omitted). 
28 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to DeWitt Clinton (May 24, 1807) in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, ser. 1, reel 38 
(attributing the “lie” of “government without religion” to “slanderer” William Linn, a villain he thought best left 
to the “scourge of public opinion”).  Jefferson also shared his lingering bitterness with friend Joseph Priestley: 
“What an effort, my dear Sir, of bigotry in politics and religion we have gone through!” Thomas Jefferson, Letter 
to Dr. Joseph Priestley (March 21, 1801) reprinted in JEFFERSON, WRITINGS supra note 22, at 1085.  See also 
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Monroe (outline) (May 26, 1801) in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, ser. 3, reel 
4 (reflecting on the “calumn[y]…of atheism” he had suffered). 
29 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 159 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2002).  Professor 
Hamburger presents a thorough and thoughtful overview of the entire Danbury Baptists episode.  Id. at 155-81. 
30 Jefferson told his Secretary of State, Levi Lincoln of Massachusetts, that the Baptists’ letter “furnishes an 
occasion . . . which I have long wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim fastings and thanksgivings, as 
my predecessors did.”  Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802) in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, 
ser. 1, reel 25. 
31 James H. Hutson, Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists: A Controversy Rejoined, 56 WM. & 
MARY Q. 775, 782 (1999). 
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not assume the prerogative of Jehovah and make Laws to govern the 
Kingdom of Christ.32 
 
Jefferson quickly seized on the Baptists’ letter as an opportunity to clarify his own 
position on official proclamations—though he recognized that this was not directly responsive 
to the Baptists’ message33—and immediately crafted a reply to the Danbury Association.  His 
original draft, in its entirety, reads as follows: 
The affectionate sentiments of esteem and approbation which you are 
so good as to express towards me on behalf of the Danbury Baptist 
Association, give me the highest satisfaction, my duties dictate a 
faithful and zealous pursuit of the interests of my constituents, and in 
proportion as they are persuaded of my fidelity to those duties, the 
discharge of them becomes more and more pleasing. 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between 
man and his god, that he owes account to none other for his faith or 
his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions 
only and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act 
of the whole American people which declared that their legislature 
should make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation 
between church and state.  Congress thus inhibited from acts 
respecting religion, and the Executive authorized only to execute their 
acts, I have refrained from prescribing even those occasional 
performances of devotion practiced indeed by the Executive of 
another nation as the legal head of its church, but subject here, as 
religious exercises, only to the voluntary regulations and disciplines 
of each respective sect.  Adhering to this expression of the supreme 
will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with 
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to 
restore to man all his natural rights, convinced that he has no natural 
right in opposition to his social duties. 
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and blessing of the 
common father and creator of man, and tender you for yourselves and 
the Danbury Baptist association assurances of my highest respect and 
esteem.34 
                                                 
32 “The Address of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut; Assembled October the 7th, 
1801, to Thomas Jefferson, Esq. President of the United States of America” (excerpt) (underline in original) in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, ser. 1, reel 24. 
33 See Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802) supra note 27 (conceding the “awkward” connection 
between official proclamations and the Baptist’s letter). 
34 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Steven S. Nelson, a Committee 
of the Danbury Baptist Association in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802) in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, ser. 
1, reel 24 (emphasis in original) [hereinafter “Jefferson to the Baptists”].   For a reproduction of the letter with 
Jefferson’s handwritten deletions revealed, see Hutson, supra note 28, at 779. 
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Here Jefferson was at pains to emphasize his particular limitations as executive of the federal 
government—which must leave the subject of religion exclusively to the state legislatures—
and he even went so far as to link national proclamations of faith with the hated English 
monarchy.35  But he also recognized that he was a Virginian, and that his words could have 
unintended consequences in the devout Northeast, so he decided to run the draft by his 
Secretary of State, Levi Lincoln of Massachusetts.36 
 Lincoln, who was familiar with New England religious and political life, suggested 
that Jefferson soften his language and innuendo regarding official proclamations, where, even 
among Republicans, “the custom is venerable being handed down from our ancestors.”37 
While he agreed that Jefferson should try to communicate his thoughts on disestablishment, 
he thought it “best to have it so guarded, as to be incapable of having it construed into an 
implied censure of the usages of any of the States.”38  The President took Lincoln’s advice 
and omitted the middle sentence of the second paragraph, which specifically derided national 
proclamations as a vestige of the English establishment.39  He noted in the margin of his 
handwritten draft that this sentence “was omitted on the suggestion that it might give 
uneasiness to some of our republican friends in the eastern states where the proclamation of 
thanksgivings etc. by their Executives is an ancient habit and is respected.”40   
The letter as sent, then, did not explicitly address the subject of federal 
proclamations—which initially had been among its primary motivations—and, as a result, the 
final draft is open to an interpretation that is not readily apparent from the original 
formulation.41  Where Jefferson’s first draft invoked the “wall of separation” between the 
federal government and religion as justification for his refusal to perform public devotions (a 
structural argument grounded in the distinct powers of state and federal governments), it is 
possible to read the final letter as a kind of free-standing statement on the potential parameters 
of a substantive federal disestablishment.  While it seems unlikely that Jefferson intended to 
                                                 
35 Jefferson to the Baptists, supra note 31. 
36 Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802) supra note 27. 
37 Levi Lincoln, Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 1, 1802) in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, ser. 1, reel 24. 
38 Id.   
39 Jefferson to the Baptists, supra note 31. 
40 Id. 
41 Perhaps as a result, the final letter did not get the publicity Jefferson had hoped for: the Baptists chose neither 
to publish it nor to employ the new language of separation in their subsequent efforts to undermine the 
Connecticut establishment.  HAMBURGER, supra note 26, at 163. 
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make such a statement—he understood the founding view of the Establishment Clause as a 
federalism provision,42 and he had willingly proclaimed days of thanksgiving when governor 
of Virginia43—his final language lent itself easily to this purpose after the Civil War, when 
substantive questions about federal disestablishment became more salient.  The natural place 
for such questions to arise was in the federal territories, where the national government 
(through territorial legislatures) exercised plenary power and in effect stood in the shoes of 
state governments elsewhere.44  And thus it was in a case from the Utah territory that the 
Supreme Court first turned its attention to Jefferson and began to construct the Danbury 
letter’s metonymic meaning. 
That case, decided in 1878, was Reynolds v. United States, in which a Mormon 
challenged his federal polygamy conviction on Free Exercise grounds.45  The Court struggled 
to find a precise constitutional definition of either “religion” or “religious freedom”—which is 
hardly surprising given that the document left the subject entirely to the states—and Chief 
Justice Morrison Waite thus decided to look beyond the text “to the history of the times in the 
midst of which the [First Amendment] was adopted.”46  In his effort to understand what 
substantive federal religious liberty might look like, Waite turned to materials written during 
Virginia’s struggle to disestablish the Anglican church: Jefferson’s Virginia Statute 
Establishing Religious Freedom and James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments.47  Then, in hopes of bridging the gap between the state and federal 
                                                 
42 See LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 74 (Macmillan, 
1986) (the clause provided “that religion as a subject of legislation was reserved exclusively to the states”).  That 
Jefferson accepted this conception is evidenced by his deliberate mark of emphasis on “their legislature” in the 
handwritten draft of the letter.  Jefferson to the Baptists, supra note 32. 
43 Thomas Jefferson, “Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and Prayer” (Nov. 11, 1779) reprinted in 
3 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 177 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1951) (notably delivered two years after he 
drafted the substance of the “Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom”). 
44 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 247-52 (Yale Univ. Press, 
1991).  Indeed, Professor Amar points out that, through the Northwest Ordinance (enacted on the same day that 
debates over an early version of the Establishment Clause took place), the First Congress actively supported 
religion in the territories; which strongly suggests that the early Clause had only structural, and not substantive, 
import.  Id. at 247.   Over time, however, as territorial legislatures struggled to implement the First Amendment 
on the ground, “the agnostic federalism reading—hard enough for some to see when the establishment clause 
addressed ‘Congress’—faded from view [and was] replaced by a substantive anti-establishment interpretation.”  
Id. at 249. 
45 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).   
46 Id. at 162. 
47 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE STATUTE OF VIRGINIA FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1786), reprinted in THE VIRGINIA 
STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM xvii-xviii (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988); JAMES 
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spheres, Waite quoted the entire central paragraph of the Danbury letter, whose pedigree 
made it he thought “an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the [First 
Amendment].”48  In so doing he began to lay the foundation for the letter’s metonymic 
meaning in constitutional practice: rather than focus on Jefferson’s literal intention to trace the 
boundaries of federal power, Waite immortalized an interpretation which treats the letter as a 
definitive statement on the substance of religious freedom.  Given that Reynolds was a Free 
Exercise case, however, it was not the “wall of separation” but Jefferson’s distinction between 
“actions” and “opinions” that interested Waite, who concluded that the Constitution did not 
preclude statutory prohibition of “acts” of polygamy.49 
 Substantive federal disestablishment continued to evolve in the territorial context, 
however, and the Danbury letter made its first appearance in an Establishment Clause 
decision when the Court of Appeals upheld the federal incorporation of a Catholic hospital in 
the District of Columbia.50  The appeals court again reproduced the letter’s central paragraph 
and quoted Chief Justice Waite’s opinion of its import, but went on to offer an opinion on the 
nature and scope of the disestablishment reflected in Jefferson’s wall metaphor: “[T]he 
declaration was intended to secure … complete religious liberty to all persons, and the 
absolute separation of the Church from the State, by the prohibition of any preference, by law, 
in favor of any one religious persuasion or mode of worship.”51  This interpretation—which 
has sometimes been labeled a “nonpreferentialist” or “accomodationist” reading52—
corresponds to what I have called an “inclusive” theory of state neutrality, which views the 
state as religiously neutral when it includes all religious viewpoints equally.53  Roberts v. 
Bradfield made its way up to the Supreme Court, which upheld the disposition below but 
chose not to invoke the Danbury letter in support of its opinion.54  The Court’s decision not to 
                                                                                                                                                        
MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in THE MIND OF THE 
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 6-7 (1785) (Marvin Meyer ed., 1981). 
48 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
49 Id. at 167.  It is perhaps ironic that, had Waite treated Reynolds as an establishment case, the interpretation of 
Jefferson’s “substantive” position might have precluded the government from establishing a particular religious 
conception of marriage. 
50 Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App.D.C. 453, ___ (1898).  The Court reasoned (somewhat unpersuasively) that the 
hospital was serving a secular (but not a religious?) purpose. 
51 Id. at __ (emphasis added). 
52 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 40, at 91; Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 12.2.1 
(2d. ed. 2002). 
53 Bartrum, Of Historiography and Constitutional Principle, supra note 15, at __. 
54 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
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adopt the inclusive gloss on the letter effectively foreclosed a possible further metonymic 
meaning of the wall metaphor—inclusivism—and, indeed, fifty years later the Court would 
construct a very different meaning in its place.  
 By the middle of the twentieth century, the Court had survived the difficult early years 
of the New Deal and emerged with a profoundly enlarged conception of federal authority.  
Encouraged by Justice Hugo Black, it began to incorporate the protections of the Bill of 
Rights into those substantive liberties the Fourteenth Amendment guards from state 
encroachment.  The Establishment Clause, however, settled awkwardly into Black’s vision of 
“total” incorporation—which mechanically enforced the first eight amendments against the 
states in their entirety—precisely because the clause was originally meant to reserve a specific 
power (religious legislation) to the states within the federalist structure.55  Black’s model of 
incorporation, however, would now strip the states of precisely this power.56  For this result to 
make sense, the Court needed to flesh out some kind of “individual” disestablishment right, 
which the Fourteenth Amendment would protect from state intrusion.  And, predictably, this 
individual right would derive from the substantive federal religious liberty the Court had 
begun to fashion in the territories. 
Black started to outline the contours of this disestablishment privilege when the Court 
incorporated the Establishment Clause in Everson.57  In considering the constitutionality of a 
New Jersey program that reimbursed parents for the cost of public transportation to parochial 
schools, Black began to construct a historical narrative—a normative ethos—in which to 
embed the emerging right.58  After painting a dramatic picture of religious intrigue, 
persecution, and political redemption in early America, he reflected on the substance of the 
religious disestablishment Madison and Jefferson had envisioned in colonial Virginia.59  
Then, to connect these colonial thoughts to the constitutional founding, he invoked Jefferson’s 
                                                 
55 See AMAR, supra note 42, at 219 (discussing the difficulty of incorporating the Establishment Clause in the 
way Black envisioned). 
56 Id. 
57 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). 
58 After all, as Robert Cover reminds us, every nomos—or communal legal structure—requires a justifying 
narrative.  Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983). 
59 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18.  Here, Black relied on two other canonical establishment texts: Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments and Jefferson’s Virginia Statute of Religious 
Freedom.  Id.  
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wall metaphor at the end of a paragraph that would become a cornerstone of federal 
disestablishment doctrine: 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means 
at least this:  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer on religion over another.  Neither can force nor 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his 
will or force him to profess belief or disbelief in any religion. . . .  In 
the words of Jefferson, the clause was intended to erect a “wall of 
separation between Church and State.”60 
 
Here Black chose to employ the wall in support of what is often called a “strict 
separationist”—or what I have called an “exclusivist”—view of state neutrality towards 
religion, which enforces neutrality by excluding all religious groups from state aid 
programs.61  This, of course, is a very different metonymic meaning than that which the 
appellate court had suggested in Bradford.  Nonetheless, the Everson majority upheld the 
New Jersey busing program as providing merely an “incidental” benefit to religion—an 
outcome that provoked a sharp dissent from Justice Wiley Rutledge, who preferred an even 
stricter separation.62  Rutledge, too, utilized the wall metaphor, lamenting that “[n]either so 
high nor so impregnable today as yesterday is the wall raised between church and state by … 
the First Amendment,” but he went further by explicitly rejecting Bradford’s inclusivist 
conception:  
The problem … cannot be cast in terms of legal discrimination or its 
absence.  This would be true, even though the state in giving aid 
should treat all religious instruction alike.  Thus, if the present statute 
and its application were shown to apply equally to all religious 
schools of whatever faith, yet in the light of our tradition it could not 
stand. … [I]t was the furnishing  of “contributions of money for the 
propagations of faith which he disbelieves” that the fathers outlawed.  
That consequence and effect are not removed by multiplying to all-
inclusiveness the sects for which support is exacted.  The Constitution 
requires, not comprehensive identification of state with religion, but 
complete separation.63 
 
                                                 
60 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added). 
61 Bartrum, Of Historiography and Constitutional Principle, supra note 15, at __. 
62 Everson, 330 U.S. at 50 (Rutledge, J. dissenting). 
63 Id. at 52, 59-60 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).   
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Just a year later the Court would consolidate the letter’s canonical status as an 
exclusivist metonym in McCollum v. Board of Education, a case which tested the 
constitutionality of an Illinois program that brought private teachers into public schools for 
voluntary weekly religion classes.64  McCollum’s various opinions both cement the wall’s 
place in the canon and clarify its metonymic meaning for future establishment argument.  
Writing again for the majority, Justice Black repeated the foundational paragraph from 
Everson, adding by way of explanation that “the First Amendment rests upon the premise that 
both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from 
the other within its respective sphere.”65  And he concluded with a rhetorical return to the now 
exclusivist symbolism of the Jefferson letter—the “wall between Church and State … must be 
kept high and impregnable”—before invalidating the Illinois program.66   
Black’s short opinion was not enough for the Everson dissenters, however, who hoped 
to both fortify and expand exclusivist principles.  Justice Felix Frankfurter began by 
suggesting that the Constitution must prohibit more than just the establishment of a national 
church, and proceeded to add metonymic mortar to the wall: 
We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a 
secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than 
merely to forbid an “established church.”  But agreement, in the 
abstract, that the First Amendment was designed to erect a “wall of 
separation between Church and State,” does not preclude a clash of 
views as to what the wall separates. … We cannot illuminatingly 
apply the “wall of separation” metaphor until we have considered the 
relevant history of religious education in America.67 
 
And the historical narrative Frankfurter then presented—centered on the supposed battle to 
secularize public education against “fierce sectarian opposition”68—gave Jefferson’s words a 
decidedly exclusivist gloss, as did his concluding thoughts: “Separation means separation, not 
something less.  Jefferson’s metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State 
                                                 
64 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).  The program brought in privately funded instructors to teach 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish classes one day a week to the children of requesting parents.  Students who 
elected not to participate received secular instruction in another classroom.  Id. at 207-09. 
65 Id. at 212. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 213 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
68 Id. at 214.  This battle was actually an effort to exclude Catholic teaching from what were universally 
acknowledged to be Protestant public schools—in which the King James Bible and Book of Common Prayer 
were central texts.  See, Ian Bartrum, The Political Origins of Secular Public Education: The New York School 
Controversy 1840-42, 3 N.Y.U. J. OF L. & LIBERTY 267, 286-320 (2008).   
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speaks of a ‘wall of separation,’ not a fine line easily overstepped.  It is the Court’s duty to 
enforce this principle in its full integrity.”69  
 Not everyone was thrilled with the Danbury letter’s emergence as an exclusivist 
metonym, however.  Justice Robert Jackson, in concurrence, did not find the symbol so easy 
to interpret: 
It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find in the 
Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where the secular 
ends and the sectarian begins in education.  Nor can we find guidance 
in any other legal source.  It is a matter on which we find no law but 
our own prepossessions. If with no surer legal guidance we are to take 
up and decide every variation of this controversy … we are likely to 
make the legal “wall of separation between Church and State” as 
winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson for 
the University he founded.70 
 
And Justice Stanley Reed, the lone dissenter, articulated real—and well-founded—historical 
reservations about the letter’s crystallizing metonymic meaning: “A reading of the general 
statements of eminent statesmen of former days … will show that circumstances such as those 
in this case were far from the minds of the authors.  The words and spirit of those statements 
may be wholeheartedly accepted without in the least impugning [the Illinois program].”71  
Reed went on to present a different history than had Frankfurter; using other materials he 
demonstrated that Jefferson envisaged a significant role for religion in the classrooms of the 
University of Virginia.72  “Thus,” he concluded 
the “wall of separation between Church and State” that Mr. Jefferson 
built at the University which he founded did not exclude religious 
education from that school.  The difference between the generality of 
his statements on the separation of church and state and the specificity 
of his conclusions on education are considerable.  A rule of law 
should not be drawn from a figure of speech.73 
 
But these doubts ran against the argumentative tide, and soon both sides of the 
neutrality debate would come to accept Jefferson’s wall as a powerful symbol of exclusivism.  
Over the next forty years, the Danbury letter made an appearance in exclusivist majority 
                                                 
69 Id. at 231. 
70 Id. at 237-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).   
71 Id. at 244 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. at 245-48. 
73 Id. at 247. 
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opinions that struck down school prayer,74 moments of silence,75 nonsectarian graduation 
prayers,76 public funding for Catholic school field trips,77 a church’s veto power over 
neighboring liquor licenses,78 and tax benefits to parochial school parents79—and in 
exclusivist dissents against decisions that upheld the loan of textbooks to Catholic schools,80 
prayer at the opening of a state legislature,81 and a private party’s display of a cross on state 
capitol grounds.82  Indeed, as is true with many symbols, the power of the wall’s metonymic 
meaning is perhaps most apparent in the inclusivist opposition’s vigorous efforts to tear it 
down. 
The Court’s seminal, and still paradigmatic, statement of inclusive neutrality appeared 
in 1952, just a few years after McCollum.  In Zorach v. Clauson, five justices upheld a New 
York City program that permitted the children of requesting parents to leave school to receive 
weekly instruction at private religious centers.83  Writing for the majority, Justice William 
Douglas began by acknowledging the exclusivist shadow of Jefferson’s wall, but quickly 
began to pick at a few cracks in the mortar: “The First Amendment, however, does not say 
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of church and state. … This is the 
common sense of the matter.  Otherwise the Church and State would be aliens to each other—
hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.”84  He then wrote a paragraph that has become an 
inclusivist cornerstone: 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.  We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses.  We 
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual 
needs of man deem necessary.  We sponsor an attitude on the part of 
the government that shows no partiality to any group and that lets 
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of 
                                                 
74 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 426 (1962).  
75 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
76 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 601 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
77 Wolman v. Walter, 423 U.S. 229, 235 (1977). 
78 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982). 
79 Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 (1973). 
80 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (Black, J., dissenting). 
81 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan outlined four purposes of the 
exclusive neutrality doctrine: (1) to prevent compelled support for another religion; (2) to prevent state 
interference with religious autonomy; (3) to protect religion from the degradation of state association; and (4) to 
prevent political divisiveness.  Id. at 803-06. 
82 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308 (1952).  The challenged program was similar to the one struck down in 
McCollum, except in Zorach the religious instruction did not occur in the public school building. 
84 Id. at 312. 
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its dogma.  When the state encourages religious instruction or 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of 
public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.  
For then it respects the religious nature of our people and 
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.  To hold that 
it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the 
government show a callous indifference to religious groups.  That 
would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who 
do believe.85 
 
For Douglas, exclusive neutrality was simply illogical: exclusivism could not claim to be truly 
neutral while forthrightly promoting a secular worldview.  And, significantly, rather than try 
to incorporate the metaphor into his own argument, Douglas simply chose to ignore it.  No 
longer even suggesting the nonpreferential reading from Bradford—which would erect the 
wall between the state and sectarianism—Douglas surrendered the Danbury letter to 
exclusivism. 
Justice Potter Stewart kept inclusivism alive in his two scathing dissents in the school 
prayer decisions of the 1960s, though, for the time being, he did not mount another direct 
attack on Jefferson’s wall.86  Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the inclusivist siege 
began in earnest.  Writing for the majority in Lynch v. Donnelly—a decision upholding a 
nativity scene on city property—Chief Justice Warren Burger offered the following thoughts: 
“The concept of a ‘wall’ of separation is a useful figure of speech probably deriving from the 
views of Thomas Jefferson … But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of 
the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.”87  
Eschewing draconian exclusivism, Burger argued that “the Constitution [does not] require 
complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not 
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility towards any.”88 
But it was soon-to-be-Chief Justice William Rehnquist historically minded dissent in 
Wallace v. Jaffree—in which the majority struck down moments of silence at a public 
school—that truly defined the modern opposition to Jefferson’s wall and began its 
                                                 
85 Id. at 313. 
86 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting);Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203, 313 
(1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
87 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1983). 
88 Id. (emphasis added). 
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decanonization.  From the outset, Rehnquist challenged the Danbury letter’s historical 
pedigree: 
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken 
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the 
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson’s 
misleading metaphor for nearly forty years.  Thomas Jefferson was of 
course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known as 
the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States.  
His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of 
courtesy, written fourteen years after the Amendments were passed by 
Congress.  He would seem to any detached observer as a less than 
ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.89 
 
Rehnquist turned instead to James Madison—who had, he thought, “two advantages over 
Jefferson in this regard: he was present in the United States, and he was a leading Member of 
the First Congress”—and looked particularly at Madison’s efforts to craft a disestablishment 
amendment during the first session of Congress.90  A review of the brief record of 
congressional debates satisfied Rehnquist that the First Amendment’s “most important 
architect …. did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of the government between 
religion and irreligion.”91  Indeed, Rehnquist argued that the language proposed by the various 
states—which Madison seemed to endorse—reveals an amendment designed not to 
discourage religious observance, but to prevent sectarian preferentialism.92 
Not content to rest with Madison, however, Rehnquist offered two additional pieces of 
historical evidence to discredit the exclusivist wall.  First, he looked to the Northwest 
Ordinance—enacted on the same day that the First Congress took up the First Amendment—
                                                 
89 Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 98.  Ironically, a review of the very same materials would convince Leonard Levy that the Establishment 
Clause has a distinctly exclusivist meaning.  LEVY, supra note 40, at 73-75.  Levy argues that these debates 
demonstrate conclusively that Congress had no power to legislate on religion, and that Rehnquist’s 
“nonpreferential” account depends upon some additional congressional authority.  Id. at 84.  While clever, 
Levy’s argument has serious logical flaws.  Although the original Establishment Clause—as a federalism 
provision—undoubtedly reserved authority over religion to the states, to suggest that the structural aspects of the 
federal amendment speak to the substance of church-state relations (again, an issue left to the states) is simply a 
category mistake.  See Bartrum, Of Historiography and Constitutional Principle, supra note 15, at __, n.86. 
92 Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Virginia and North Carolina proposed identical language 
ensuring that “no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference of 
others.”  3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659 (1891); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, at 244.   New 
York and Rhode Island likewise suggested that no “religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by 
law in preference to others.”  1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, at 328, 334. 
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as a true indication of congressional intentions regarding the substance of federal 
disestablishment.93  Again, because the federal government exercised State-like plenary 
power in the territories, it was here that the contours of federal church-state relations took 
shape.94  Rehnquist pointed to the Ordinance’s declaration that “[r]eligion, morality, and 
knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and 
the means of education shall forever be encouraged” as evidence that Congress intended to 
actively encourage religion in the territories.95  And, second, Rehnquist turned to a House of 
Representatives resolution (proposed just a day later) that asked President George Washington 
to issue a proclamation giving “Almighty God their sincere thanks for the many blessings he 
had poured down upon them.”96  The House passed the resolution just over a month later, and 
President Washington issued the proclamation within a few weeks.97  All of this was proof 
enough for Rehnquist that there was “simply no historical foundation for the … ‘wall of 
separation’ that was constitutionalized in Everson.”98  Indeed, rather than try to reclaim or 
refine the wall metonym, Rehnquist hoped simply to relegate Jefferson’s words to the 
constitutional dustbin: “We have done much straining since 1947, but still we admit that we 
can only dimly perceive the Everson wall.  Our perception has been clouded not by the 
Constitution, but by the mists of an unnecessary metaphor.”99 
By 2000, the Court’s ideological center had moved towards Rehnquist, and inclusivist 
efforts to dismantle the metonymic wall began to meet with more success.  Mitchell v. Helms 
upheld a Louisiana program that provided teaching materials to religious and secular schools 
on an equal basis,100 and Good News Club v. Milford Central School required a New York 
school that opened its gymnasium to community groups after hours to include religious 
groups on an equal basis.101  Justice Clarence Thomas’s majority opinion in the latter case 
eagerly endorsed inclusive neutrality: “Because allowing [religious groups] to speak on 
                                                 
93 Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
94 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
95 Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) quoting Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1789). 
96 Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 101 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 914 (1789).  Elias Boudinot, 
who proposed the resolution, also voted in favor of the Establishment Clause.  Id. 
97 Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 101-2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  John Adams, Washington’s successor, would also 
issue official proclamations of thanksgiving.  Id. 
98 Id. at 93. 
99 Id. at 112 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
100 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 873 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
101 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001). 
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school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it, Milford faces an uphill battle in 
arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to exclude [these groups].”102  As a result of 
these changes on the Court—including a calculated shift towards free speech analysis103—
exclusivists have found themselves increasingly called upon to defend the wall, and the once 
hard spot in the constitutional canon has begun to loosen and shift.  So much so that in Van 
Orden v. Perry, a 2005 decision that upheld the display of a monument of the Ten 
Commandments on the Texas state capitol grounds, dissenting Justice John Paul Stevens was 
left desperately plugging holes in the eroding metonymic wall: “If any fragment of Jefferson's 
metaphorical ‘wall of separation between church and State’ is to be preserved—if there 
remains any meaning to the wholesome ‘neutrality’ of which this Court's Establishment 
Clause cases speak—[the Texas display must come down].”104 
All of this is, I hope, a useful illustration of the emergence, evolution, and incipient 
decline of a canonical metonym within the historical modality of constitutional practice.  
Originally introduced as a means of bridging the gap between state and federal 
disestablishment principles, Jefferson’s Danbury letter—with its concise and powerful image 
of “a wall of separation between church and state”—fell quickly and neatly into the rhythms 
of constitutional argument.  Over a few short years, metonymic associations began to accrete 
around the wall and cemented its place in the canon as seemingly imperturbable evidence of a 
founding commitment to exclusive neutrality.  And, as is often the case, these emerging 
metonymic meanings were far removed from the letter’s original or literal meaning, which 
was a structural description of the relative authority of state and federal government over 
religious matters.  It is, after all, not so much the letter’s historical significance, but rather its 
utility as a piece on the argumentative chess board, that ensured its place in the canon.  But, 
perhaps inevitably, as the wall’s power and influence became more apparent, exclusivism’s 
ideological opponents made concerted efforts to discredit or dislodge it: in effect, to de-
canonize it.  While the focus of these particular efforts has been simply to devalue the wall as 
constitutional currency, the next section—which examines the evolution of a canonical piece 
                                                 
102 Id. at 114. 
103 See Ian Bartrum, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 43 
(2009). This line of doctrine runs from Widmar v, Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) through Lamb’s Chapel v. 
Center for Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993) and Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 
515 U.S. 819 (1995) to Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
104 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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of doctrine—illustrates the sometimes more powerful technique of refining metonymic 
meanings to conform to a changing constitutional culture. 
 
II. DOCTRINE: THE LEGAL ACADEMY, LOCHNER, AND CANONICAL REFINEMENT 
Of Bobbitt’s six modalities, doctrinal argument, with its emphasis on stare decisis and 
neutral principles, relies perhaps more than any other on canonical texts, some of which have 
come to be known as “superprecedents.”105  But, for these same reasons, it may be surprising 
to discover that cases, too, can take on metonymic meanings divorced from their literal texts.  
Indeed, precisely because the skilled doctrinalist must be expert at distilling and 
recharacterizing precedents and neutral “tests,” it is in this modality that some of the most 
dramatic recalibrations of metonymic meaning occur over time.  This section examines one of 
the most canonical, or more precisely “anti-canonical,” decisions rendered during the last 
century.  Despite some recent rehabilitation,106 Lochner v. New York remains among the more 
vicious doctrinal epithets one can hurl at a constitutional opponent.107  But the accusation has 
changed over time, and in what follows I explore the ways that our constitutional practice, 
particularly in the academic sphere, has refined Lochner’s metonymic meaning over the 
course of the last century.  
Indeed, it is perhaps true that no case illustrates the metonymic nature of the 
constitutional canon better than Lochner.  It has lent its name to an entire chapter of 
constitutional history: the so-called Lochner Era.108  But what exactly are the associated 
meanings to which the metonym points us?  What do we mean when we accuse someone of 
                                                 
105 Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in “Superprecedents”?, N.Y. TIMES [section] 4, p.1 (Oct. 30, 2005). 
106 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 101 (1991) (arguing the Court was properly 
fulfilling its “preservationist” function in our dualist democracy); OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE 
MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 19 (1993) (describing Lochner as a reasonable “attempt to explicate and protect the 
constitutional ideal of liberty”); G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s Lochner 
Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87 (1997) (challenging historical disapproval of Lochner); James W. Ely, Reflections 
on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND. L. REV. 953, 967 (1998) (describing conventional 
accounts of the Lochner Era as “winner’s history”); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 
(1998) (attributing Lochner Era decisions to weakening police powers doctrine); David E. Bernstein, Lochner 
Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 
(2003) (locating Lochner in the fundamental rights tradition of substantive due process). 
107 See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (2003) (“Lochner v. New York 
would probably win the prize, if there were one, for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred years.”).  
108 There is some dispute as to when this phrase arose, but it gained widespread acceptance after Gerald Gunther 
used it in the 1970 edition of his popular casebook. GERALD GUNTHER & NOEL T. DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 982-84 (8th ed. 1970); accord David A. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A 
Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1469, 1518 (2005). 
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“Lochnering”?109  Some modern commentators have suggested that the case’s metonymic 
meaning remains unclear; that it is difficult to say with any certainty what is wrong with 
Lochner.110  But this confusion is, I think, rhetorical, as scholars struggle to draw a principled 
distinction between the Court’s efforts to protect the liberty of contract in the early twentieth 
century, and its determination to enforce civil and reproductive rights under Earl Warren and 
Warren Burger.111  I suggest that, in truth, all of these uncertainties—the revilement, the 
revision, the distinctions and clarifications—are simply part of an ongoing battle to distill 
Lochner’s metonymic meanings within constitutional practice.  They are a manifestation of 
the continuing struggle to reclaim or refine the “hard” spot the case occupies in the 
constitutional riverbank; the perpetual effort to define what Lochner stands for, or, more 
importantly, what it stands against.   
Having said all this, I believe that most lawyers—those blissfully unversed in the 
mounting academic literature—understand Lochner as a metonym for unbridled judicial 
activism; a shorthand description of a court overreaching its constitutional authority and 
thwarting majority will as represented in the legislature.112  As such, the Lochner metonym 
reflects the core of the countermajoritarian objection to judicial review,113 and its edge cuts 
against any advocate—no matter the ideology—who would use the courts to further a social 
or political agenda.  And, because its invocation challenges a court’s very legitimacy when it 
reaches certain kinds of decisions or provides certain kinds of relief, Lochner has become a 
fascinating and powerful argumentative tool.  In what follows, I trace Lochner’s journey into 
infamy and the constitutional anti-canon, but I also hope to account for more recent efforts to 
refine or distill it metonymically.  In the process, I will suggest that Lochner provides a 
particularly striking example of the legal academy’s impact on the constitutional canon and, 
                                                 
109 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 269 (1998); accord HOWARD GILLMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1993) 
(using the term “Lochnerizing”).  
110 Strauss, supra note 104, at 374 (“The striking thing about the disapproval of Lochner, though, is that there is 
no consensus why it is wrong.”). 
111 See id. (“The puzzle, for anyone who generally accepts the way constitutional law has evolved over the last 
half century or so, is to find an argument against Lochner that would not undermine those developments as 
well.”). 
112 See Jack Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 
677, 686 (2005) (arguing that the conventional account suggests that “the Justices during the Lochner Era 
repeatedly overstepped their appropriate roles as judges by reading their own political values into the 
Constitution”). 
113 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 16-23 (2d. ed. 1986) (describing the “Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty”). 
 24
by extension, constitutional meaning.114  But, as before, I begin by putting the case’s original 
or literal meaning in constitutional context. 
The Lochner story begins during the late 1870s, when journeyman bakers in New 
York and other major cities began to unionize and push for labor reforms.115  The largest and 
most powerful union to emerge consisted predominantly of German bakers—indeed, it was 
initially known in the press as the National Union of German Bakers—and in January of 1886 
its members convened to seek a reduction of the average workday.116  Despite some modern 
dispute,117 it seems reasonably clear that the bakers had both economic and republican goals 
in mind.118  In a call to arms, the Baker’s Journal—the English language version of the union 
organ Deutsche-Amerikanische Baeckerzeitung—presented the resolutions that compelled the 
newly named Journeyman Bakers National Union to submit a maximum hours bill to the New 
York legislature in 1887:119 
Whereas it is a well-known fact that the excessive work in the baker 
shops is undermining health and shortening the lives of those 
employed therein. 
Whereas the journeymen bakers were hitherto compelled to work too 
many hours, inconsequence of which those having employment had to 
                                                 
114 As I have suggested elsewhere, there are many spheres or institutions of constitutional discourse and 
argument, among which are the academy, the courts, the bar, the legislature, and the executive branch.  Bartrum 
Metaphors and Modalities, supra note 7, at 161. 
115 STUART B. KAUFMAN, A VISION OF UNITY: THE HISTORY OF THE BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY WORKERS 
INTERNATIONAL UNION 3-5 (1986). 
116 Id. at 6.  It is worth noting that the maximum hours issue was the catalyst for a great deal of the union 
organizing that occurred in the late nineteenth century.  See DAVID ROEDIGER & PHILIP FONER, OUR OWN TIME: 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR AND THE WORKING DAY 19-42 (1989) (“[I]ncreasing attention to the hours 
issue was the key element in the transformation of labor’s consciousness and organization.”); accord PAUL 
KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK  22 (1990) (“To a great 
extent early labor unions had organized around the issue of the eight-hour workday.”).  In John Swinton’s Paper, 
a Michigan baker recounted the particular struggles faced in his industry: “We are having quite a time here with 
our bosses.  One of them got wind we were going to ask for shorter hours and the first thing he did was discharge 
one of our boys. . . . I think very likely that there will be a boycott thrown … by the K[nights] of L[abor].”  
Journeyman Bakers National Union, JOHN SWINTON’S PAPER, (Jul. 10, 1787). 
117 Matthew Bewig, for example, contends that the bakers’ principal motivations were republican and communal, 
see Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeyman Bakers of New York: The Journeyman Bakers, Their Hours 
of Labor, and the Constitution: A Case Study in the Social History of Legal Thought, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 413, 
419 (1994), while Richard Epstein argues that larger, unionized bakers (who did not often work more than ten 
hours per day) simply hoped to drive smaller “basement” bakeries (which relied on longer hours) out of 
business, see Richard Epstein, The Mistake of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 5, 17-18 (1988).  Paul Kens 
strikes a seemingly sensible path somewhere down the middle of these two positions, see KENS, supra note 114, 
at 15. 
118 Bewig, supra note 115, at 431-4. 
119 It appears that, going into the union convention, some bakers worked “as many as eighteen hours a day,” and 
thus resolved to settle for a ten or twelve-hour work day as anything shorter simply “could not be gained.”  
George Block, The Bakers, JOHN SWINTON’S PAPER (Feb. 17, 1886). 
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perform the work of two men while a great many had to go idle for 
want of work. 
Whereas as a result of this great abuse one part of the journeymen 
bakers ruined themselves by overwork, while the other portion, being 
idle, were a prey to abject misery through the enforced idleness. 
Whereas in consequence of this state of affairs, those employed in the 
bakeries were bodily and mentally degenerated to a degree unworthy 
of citizens belonging to a free commonwealth 
Be it resolved, that we look upon the bill now before the Legislature, 
making ten hours a day’s work in bakeries, as a measure to elevate the 
condition of journeymen bakers bodily and mentally, which should be 
adopted without delay by the Assembly after its passage in the Senate. 
Resolved, that the law is not only a measure for the interest of public 
health, but it will also be in the interest of morality and civilization, 
securing liberty to a class literally enslaved by their calling.120 
  
While it is fascinating to note how these arguments track the issues that would eventually 
animate and (perhaps unconsciously) divide the Supreme Court, the first bakery bill failed to 
capture a majority of the State Assembly, and the journeyman bakers left Albany empty 
handed.121 
It would take eight years and a series of muckraking newspaper reports by New York 
Press editor Edward Marshall—likely coordinated with Union leader Henry Weismann—to 
generate sufficient public outcry behind a renewed push for maximum hours legislation.122  In 
late September of 1894, Marshall published a vivid description of the wretched and unhealthy 
conditions prevalent in tenement basement bakeries under the provocative headline “Bread 
and Filth Cooked Together.”123  Marshall followed up with a series of reports on the dangers 
that the basement bakeries—and the “wage slaves” working interminable hours within—
presented to public health and the moral community.124  These articles and corroborating state 
inspections eventually prompted public calls for the legislature to again consider action to 
reform the baking industry.125 
                                                 
120 The Grand Mass-Meeting, BAKER’S JOURNAL (April 27, 1887); accord Bewig, supra note 115, at 431 
(quoting a later, modified version of the resolutions). 
121 Bewig, supra note 15, at 431. The bill passed the Senate but failed in the assembly 56-45.  Id. 
122 KENS, supra note 114, at 50-53. 
123 NEW YORK PRESS, (Sept. 30, 1894).  The plight of the tenements and their occupants was a common theme in 
the labor press as well, see, e.g., Pest Breeding Tenements, JOHN SWINTON’S PAPER (Dec. 20, 1885); Pest 
Breeding Tenements, JOHN SWINTON’S PAPER (Jan. 3, 1886).  The effort to link bakery work with the general 
tenement problem was therefore a well-calculated one.  KENS, supra note 114, at 50-55. 
124  
125 Bernstein, A Centennial Retrospective, supra note 107, at 1479-80. 
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New York lawmakers based the Bakeshop Act, as it was called, largely on similar 
regulations enacted in England126—with the major addition of a provision limiting the time 
“biscuit, bread or cake bakery” employees could work to ten hours in a day or sixty hours in a 
week.127  As such a substantial addition, it seems unlikely that the hours limitation was a 
trivial or unnoticed inclusion in the bill—although it does seem slightly out of keeping with 
the Act’s other sanitary regulations128—or that it was included at the eleventh hour to appease 
Union lobbyists.  Indeed, the provision occupied a place of prominence as Section One, and 
there is evidence that the word “person” in the first sentence was changed to “employee” to 
allay last minute constitutional concerns.129  This final change assumes all the more 
significance because it seems to have been nearly the only issue of concern to lawmakers, as 
the bill sailed unanimously through the both the Senate (29-0) and the State Assembly (90-0) 
and became law on May 2, 1895.130  The somewhat surprising universal support, which would 
later provide ammunition for the Court’s countermajoritarian critics, likely resulted from a 
lack of political organization among bakery owners; the division of interests between large 
bakeshops and smaller basement bakeries; and the thought that state regulation would better 
the reputation, and thus the profits, of bakers generally.131 
The Act’s final provisions authorized its enforcement through the routine visits of 
state factory inspectors and their deputies,132 whose reports show that for the first few years 
the new law was fairly ineffective.133  In fact, in 1897 only 312 of the 855 bakeries inspected 
                                                 
126 Id. 
127 The first section of the Bakeshop Act read as follows: 
 
No employee shall be required, permitted, or suffered to work in a 
biscuit, bread, or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more 
than sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one 
day, unless for the purpose of making a shorter work day on the last 
day of the week, nor more hours in a any one week than will make an 
average of ten hours per day for the whole number of days in which 
such person shall so work during such week. 
 
N.Y. LAWS, ch. 415, art. 8, § 110 (1895) reprinted in KENS, supra note 114, at 169. 
128 Describe provisions… 
129 KENS, supra note 114, at 58.  This change allowed bakery owners to continue working as long as they wished. 
130 Id. at 59. 
131 Bernstein, A Centennial Retrospective, supra note 107, at 1482-83. 
132 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 415, art. 8, § 116 (1895) reprinted in KENS, supra note 114, at 170. 
133 ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 113, at 157. 
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complied with the maximum hours provision.134  By 1899, it appears that most of the 
unionized bakeries observed the ten-hour limit,135 though it is less clear what was happening 
in the city basements.  In practice, it was the Union’s, rather than State’s, enforcement efforts 
that were the key to law’s success in those areas where it was observed.  The State Factory 
Inspector himself conceded as much: “The hours of labor in bakeshops cannot be successfully 
regulated in my opinion but in one way, and that is by a thorough and complete organization 
by the craft itself.”136  But it was perhaps in this capacity, as a rallying point for Union 
activity and membership, that the Bakeshop Act was most significant and presented the 
biggest threat to laissez-faire economics and the bakery owners.137 
And, in the meantime, those owners had begun to accumulate more political power, 
including the defection to their ranks of the shrewd and influential Union leader Henry 
Weismann, who had been instrumental in getting the Bakeshop Act passed.138  Judicial events 
also began to inspire hope in the newly formed Master Baker’s Association that organized 
opposition to the sixty-hour limitation might eventually bring it down.139  Picking up on 
Justices Stephen Field’s140 and Joseph Bradley’s141 dissents in the Slaughterhouse Cases and 
Munn v. Illinois, some state courts had begun to find merit in Thomas Cooley’s ideas about 
constitutional property rights and what would come to be known as “substantive due 
process.”142  To protect the “constitutional privilege” of contract, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
                                                 
134 Sidney G. Tarrow, Lochner v. New York: A Political Analysis, 5 LABOR HIST. 277, 289 (1964).  This was 
partly a problem of getting workers to report their employers.  Id. at 288. 
135 Id. at 290; accord ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 113, at 157.  
136 Testimony of Daniel O’Leary, Factory Inspector of the State New York, to the U.S. Industrial Comm’n 
(March 8, 1899) quoted in Tarrow, supra note 132, at 289. 
137 Tarow, supra note 132, at 290. 
138 KENS, supra note 114, at 98-99.  Weismann had a falling out with the Union over corruption charges and 
resigned in 1897.  He then opened a bakery of his own and began to appreciate the owners’ side of the issue.  Id. 
139 Tarrow, supra note 136, at 291-93. 
140 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 105-06 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that the privileges and 
immunities clause must jealously guard the “sacred right of labor”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1876) 
(Field, J., dissenting) (finding doctrine that allows legislative regulation of businesses affected with the public 
interest “subversive of the rights of property”).   
141 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (locating the right to property among “the 
fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of law”). For a useful history of these 
developments in the Supreme Court, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, 
FLOWERING, AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JURIDICAL CONCEPT 130-45 (1948). 
142 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 508-510 (7th ed. 1903) (developing idea of 
substantive limitations on legislatures that protect certain “vested rights” encompassed in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).  As late as 1948, Edward Corwin would call Cooley’s book—originally 
published in 1868—“the most influential treatise ever published on constitutional law,” and his ideas about 
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Court had invalidated legislation prohibiting payments in the form of company store credit;143 
the Nebraska Supreme Court had struck down an hours limitation for mechanics and 
laborers;144 and the Illinois Supreme Court had invalidated a similar restriction for women 
factory workers.145 Closer to home, the New York Court of Appeals had upheld some 
workplace regulations as within the state police power,146 but was generally gaining a 
reputation as hostile towards legislation abridging the right to sell one’s labor.147  And the 
United States Supreme Court, which had grudgingly upheld labor laws through the 1880s,148 
finally seemed to turn in the master bakers’ favor when it struck down a Louisiana law that 
interfered with the fundamental “right to contract.”149 True enough, the Court subsequently 
upheld a maximum hours law governing Utah miners,150 but overall judicial developments 
augured well enough for the master bakers that by 1901 they were ready to challenge the 
Bakeshop Act in state court.151 
Joseph Lochner operated a non-union bakery in Utica, New York, and he had steadily 
resisted efforts to enforce the maximum hours provision.152  When the Union filed a 
complaint and had him arrested for a second time, the master bakers decided to use his case to 
                                                                                                                                                        
property rights, in particular, had wide currency.  CORWIN, supra note 140, at 116.  On the seeds of substantive 
due process, see KENS, supra note 115, at 87-89, though it is worth noting that the doctrine did not formally 
distinguish between “substantive” and “procedural” due process until the 1950s.  G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 245 (2000). 
143 Godcharles v. Wiegman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886). 
144 Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362, 368 (Neb. 1894). 
145 Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 462 (Ill. 1895).  Other notable state cases vindicating the liberty of contract 
were: State v. Haun, 59 P. 340, 344-45 (Kan. 1899); Leep v. Railway Co., 25 S.W. 75, 83 (Ark. 1894); State v. 
Loomis, 22 S.W. 350, 353 (Mo. 1893); People v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127 (Mass. 1891); State v. Fire Creek 
Coal & Coke Co., 10 S.E. 288, 289 (W.Va. 1889). 
146 See, e.g., People v. Ewer, 36 N.E. 4 (N.Y. 1894) (upholding ban on child labor in theaters); People v. Havnor, 
43 N.E. 541 (N.Y. 1896) (upholding prohibition on Sunday barber shops in Brooklyn); accord Felice Batlan, A 
Reevaluation of the New York Court of Appeals: The Home, The Market, and Labor, 1885-1905, 27 LAW & SOC. 
INQ. 489 (2002) (reviewing cases). 
147 Of particular renown was In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885), which struck down a law that banned cigar-
making in city tenements, but the court had also invalidated a minimum wage law and derided other “paternal” 
kinds of labor regulations in Rodgers v. Coler, 59 N.E. 716 (N.Y. 1901).  Accord, Bernstein, A Centennial 
Retrospective, supra note 107, at 1489. 
148 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been 
enacted to protect the public health . . . is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the 
duty of the courts so to adjudge.”); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888) (upholding prohibition on 
oleo margarine sales because it did not “infringe[] rights secured by fundamental law”). 
149 Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897) (invalidating prohibition on entering into insurance 
contracts with companies not in compliance with state laws). 
150 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
151 Tarrow, supra note 136, at 293. 
152 Id. 
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test the Bakeshop Act’s constitutional merits.153  At trial in early 1902, Lochner offered no 
plea and no defense, and instead accepted his conviction to set the stage for an appeal on the 
question of law.154  His first appeal was to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court, which split three to two against him.155  Writing for the majority, Judge John Davy 
held that the Bakeshop Act, including the hours limitation, fell within the state legislature’s 
inherent police powers, and thus did not violate Lochner’s due process rights.156  But this was 
not the master bakers’ only—or even, perhaps, their strongest—constitutional claim.   Since 
the Civil War, courts had grown increasingly suspicious of labor laws that appeared to single 
out particular industries for regulation.157  If a law of this kind was deemed arbitrary or 
unreasonable, a court might strike it down under the Equal Protection Clause as illegal “class 
legislation.”158  Confident of a better reception for both this and their due process 
arguments,159 the bakers’ decide to take their appeal to New York’s highest court. 
It was not to be, however, as the Court of Appeals once again upheld Lochner’s 
conviction, this time in a four to three split.160  Chief Judge Alton Parker, who would parlay 
progressive support into that year’s Democratic presidential nomination,161 wrote the majority 
opinion rejecting the bakers’ Fourteenth Amendment claims.162   He began by reviewing both 
state and federal precedents placing the authority to protect the public health firmly among the 
legislature’s police powers.163  Then, relying particularly on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Holden v. Hardy (the Utah mining case),164 Parker self-consciously deferred to the 
legislature’s judgments on how best to ensure healthy bakeries and bakers: 
[W]e must assume—even if the object of the legislature in limiting 
the hours of work of employees is not to protect the health of the 
                                                 
153 Bernstein, A Centennial Retrospective, supra note 107, at 1487.   
154 Id.  On trial date, see People v. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396 (1902). 
155 Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. at 396.    
156 Id.  The opinion is not entirely clear as to whether it is addressing the equal protection claim, the due process 
claim, or both.  Based on the cases discussed, however, it appears the court was more focused on the due process 
arguments. 
157 See GILLMAN, supra note 108, at 62-63. 
158 Bernstein, A Centennial Retrospective, supra note 107, at 1488. 
159 It is perhaps worth noting that some courts still styled this as both a due process and a privileges and 
immunities claim, despite the near annihilation of the latter clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases.  See People v. 
Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 375 (N.Y. 1904) (discussing right of contract as privileges and immunities claim). 
160 Lochner, 69 N.E. at 373. 
161 Tarrow, supra note 136, at 295. 
162 Lochner, 69 N.E. at 381. 
163 Id. at 374-77. 
164 169 U.S. 366 (1898).  See note 148 supra and accompanying text. 
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general public, who take wares made by such employees—that the 
legislature intends to protect the health of the employees in such 
establishments; that, for some reason sufficient to it, it has reached the 
conclusion that in work of this character men ought not to be 
employed more than an average of ten hours a day.165 
 
And, given appropriate judicial deference, he concluded that the Bakeshop Act fell well 
within the state’s constitutionally reserved police powers.166  In a notable concurrence that 
presaged Louis Brandeis’ famous brief of a few years later,167 Judge Irving Vann provided his 
own social science data to support the law’s stated purpose.168  The dissenting judges, by 
contrast, felt less deferential and more confident in their own authority to declare the 
legislature’s health pretensions “a mere disguise that is not sufficient to save the statute from 
condemnation.”169 
 Disheartened by this latest failure, the master bakers’ principal attorney resigned and 
advised them not to waste money on what he thought was a hopeless appeal to the Supreme 
Court.170  Undaunted, the Master Bakers Association decided to take up a collection from its 
membership to fund the federal appeal, and promptly hired former Union leader Henry 
Weismann to take the lead.171   In the meantime, the case garnered growing national attention, 
partly due to Judge Parker’s presidential campaign, but also through the bakers’ concerted 
efforts to publicize their complaint.172  As a result, the Association remained quietly hopeful 
as it awaited the Court’s decision through the early months of 1905; still, in truth, it must have 
been something of a pleasant surprise when, on April 17, a divided Court declared section one 
of the Bakeshop Act unconstitutional.173  Equally surprising, Chief Justice Rufus Peckham’s 
majority opinion eschewed the class legislation argument and analyzed the case under the Due 
                                                 
165 Lochner, 69 N.E. at 380. 
166 Id. 
167 See Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107) reprinted in 16 
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168 Lochner, 69 N.E. at 382-84 (Vann, J., concurring). 
169 Id. at 387 (O’Brien, J., dissenting). 
170 Bernstein, A Centennial Retrospective, supra note 107, at 1491. 
171 Id.  Sydney Tarrow would later characterize Weismann’s pivotal role in both creating and destroying the 
Bakeshop Act as “the choicest irony of all.” Tarrow, supra note 136, at 298. 
172 Tarrow, supra note 136, at 295. 
173 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 31
Process Clause; a decision which would ultimately set Lochner on a collision course with the 
constitutional anti-canon.174   
 From the outset, Peckham made it clear that the liberty of contract fell squarely within 
the emerging constellation of substantive rights implicit in the Fourteen Amendment’s due 
process guarantee: 
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between 
the employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in 
which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer.  The general 
right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty 
of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.  Under that provision no state can deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  The 
right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this 
amendment.175 
 
He conceded that certain inherent state powers—those related to the “safety, health, morals, 
and general welfare of the public”—might temper this liberty, but such concerns could not 
justify the Bakeshop Act because there was “no fair doubt that the trade of the baker, in and of 
itself, is not an unhealthy one.”176  Despite offering this ipse dixit—and further opining that 
Act’s “real object and purpose [was] simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master 
and his employees”177—Peckham nevertheless insisted the decision was “not a question of 
substituting the judgment of the court for that of the legislature.”178 
 Four Justices were not convinced, however, and Oliver Wendell Holmes’s short 
dissent would, in future years, become as significant within constitutional practice as the 
majority opinion.  While his mordant observation that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics” has perhaps gotten the most attention, Holmes 
most clearly expressed the fundamental basis of his dissidence in the first few sentences: “I 
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of the 
majority to embody their opinions in law.”179  This bare statement of judicial conservatism 
and deference—obviously problematic in its own right as a constitutional maxim—would 
                                                 
174 Id. at 53; accord Bernstein, A Centennial Retrospective, supra note 107, at 1497. 
175  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (internal citations omitted). 
176 Id. at 53, 59. 
177 Id. at 64. 
178 Id. at 56-57. 
179 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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provide the theoretical contrast against which future lawyers would posit the doctrinal sin of 
“Lochnering.”  Indeed, as Lochner’s infamy grew, Holmes’s dissent assumed a corresponding 
place of prominence within the constitutional canon—or perhaps it is the other way around.180 
For the time being, however, Holmes and Justice John Marshall Harlan, who also 
wrote in dissent, were simply friends of the modern Progressive, standing up for labor against 
the old guard of the American free market. And, while perhaps unexpected, Peckham’s 
majority opinion was by no means a sharp break with constitutional culture or practice.181   
Quixotically, it might even have been seen as the latest salvo in a libertarian tradition 
stretching back to abolitionism; one which jealously guarded a freeman’s right to sell his 
labor on his own terms.182  Certainly substantive due process doctrine, and the “liberty of 
contract” in particular, had juridical opponents in 1905, but, by any clear-eyed assessment of 
its literal terms, the Lochner decision intimated nothing of the ignominy that was to come 
with the next century of constitutional argument. And, while much of that disrepute 
undoubtedly grew out of the decisive shifts in economic circumstance and policy that 
occurred in the 1930s, Lochner’s status as an anti-canonical metonym emerged in large part 
from within the legal academy. 
Although the decision elicited only a muted response from the union press (perhaps 
because it had little practical effect),183 it prompted thoughtful and respected criticism in legal 
journals.  Ernst Freund published a multi-faceted reproach in Green Bag, in which he took the 
Court to task on doctrinal, structural, prudential, and even analytical grounds, ultimately 
suggesting that “[a] decision that reads into the Fourteenth Amendment a vague and 
controverted concept of the liberty of contract, is a novel, and hardly a fortunate step in the 
development of our constitutional law.”184  As a doctrinal matter, Freund argued that Holden 
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v. Hardy should have controlled the outcome in Lochner, but of more interest is his structural 
suggestion that, in general, the Supreme Court should defer to a state court’s judgment about 
how broadly the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the legislative prerogative: 
A decision of a state court even of last resort, giving an unduly wide 
scope to the rights of liberty or of property as against the legislative 
power, is inconclusive in so far as it interprets the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and although its construction of the state constitution is 
conclusive, that constitution can be changed with comparative facility 
. . . .  But a decision of the Supreme Court, interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the prejudice of legislative power, not only nullifies 
state constitutional amendments seeking to neutralize the effects of 
decisions of state courts, but in its turn, would be practically 
irreversible . . . for the difficulties in the way of changing the 
Fourteenth Amendment are almost insuperable.  That amendment 
ought, therefore, to be interpreted so as to enforce only that 
fundamental law quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, which 
is uniformly recognized as binding by civilized nations.185 
 
Freund’s thrust here is undoubtedly aimed at judicial activism, though not quite the same 
species of politicized activism with which Lochner would later come to be associated.  
Rather, he urges a kind of modest structural conservatism—perhaps something roughly 
analogous to Alexander Bickel’s prudentialist “passive virtues”186—although, concededly, he 
does more radically suggest that fundamental due process rights should be limited to those 
long recognized by everyone everywhere. 
 Equally unimpressed with the liberty of contract’s historical or intellectual pedigree 
was Roscoe Pound, who began his Lochner commentary by scouring the classics of natural 
law theory for the supposedly fundamental right.187  These efforts were, of course, fruitless; 
yet Pound had no trouble locating the novel privilege in recent judicial opinions from around 
the country.188  He attributed this incongruity to seven factors, the most interesting of which 
he described as the prevalence of a “mechanical jurisprudence”; or a “condition of juristic 
thought and judicial action … in which conceptions are developed logically at the expense of 
practical results.”189  To Pound’s mind, judges weaned on the fiction of theoretically absolute 
common law principles would hold stubbornly to “predetermined conceptions . . . often in the 
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teeth of the actual facts.”190  Thus, actual social circumstance and relative bargaining power 
notwithstanding, legislative attempts to even the industrial playing field were held to infringe 
on a theoretical—and so factually unimpeachable—equality.191  Pound’s remedy for this 
mechanistic disease was what he called a “sociological jurisprudence”; one that tailored 
“principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed 
first principles.”192  The trouble with Lochner, then, was not that the Court was too activist, 
but that it was too conservative.  A blind adherence to formalistic principles and traditional 
categories not only impeded political activism and progressive growth in the legislatures, it 
actually stripped the courts of a power they might rightly assume to take notice of the world 
and adjust the law accordingly.  Neither Freund nor Pound, then, saw the precise metonymic 
meanings that Lochner would assume in the latter half of the century, but the general shape of 
the emerging constitutional complaint is certainly evident in these initial commentaries. 
 The contours of what would become the conventional metonym came into sharper 
focus in Learned Hand’s analysis of the due process question in the Harvard Law Review.193  
Through careful doctrinal argument, Hand demonstrated that the majority had abandoned the 
historical understanding of “due process” as the “customary or common process of law” in 
favor of a conception that saw “the function of the Court [as analogous to] the function of a 
court in review of the facts.”194  In other words, the Court had positioned itself as the final 
arbiter of whether a liberty-limiting statute had sufficient (or “due”) relation to a 
constitutionally valid purpose; and it would overturn those laws whose infirmity was “obvious 
beyond peradventure.”195  This revised due process doctrine, Hand argued, raised questions 
much larger than the merits of maximum hours legislation: 
Whether it be wise or not that there should be a third camera with a 
final veto upon legislation with whose economic or political 
expediency it totally disagrees, is a political question of the highest 
importance.  In particular it is questionable whether such a power can 
endure in a democratic state, while the Court retains the 
irresponsibility of life tenure, and while its decisions can be reversed 
only by the cumbersome process of a change of the federal 
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Constitution. . . . [I]f the Court is to retain the absolute right to pass in 
the final result on the expediency of statutes passed by the legislature, 
the difficulty is inherent and in the end may demand some change, 
either in the Court or in the Constitution.196 
 
Here, then, are the seeds of the Lochner we love to hate; a decision whose symbolic overreach 
calls into doubt the very institution of judicial review.197  And they emerged as theoretical 
objections in the pages of legal scholarship—some admittedly penned by a prominent judge—
because, in truth, Lochner had very little doctrinal or practical effect over the next decade. 
 In those areas where union membership was strong, the ten-hour day remained largely 
in force; and in other areas the Bakeshop Act had never had much purchase to begin with.198  
For its part, the Court actually upheld the majority of labor legislation that came before it over 
the next decade.199  In fact, in 1914 Congress enlarged the Court’s jurisdiction over state court 
judgments in order to protect progressive labor legislation from overzealous state judges.200 
Writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1915, Felix Frankfurter concluded that, “the 
groundwork of the Lochner case has by this time been cut from under. .... The fundamental 
constitutional doctrine of the assumption of rightness of legislative conduct, where the court is 
uninformed, is again rigorously being enforced.”201  And in 1917 Lochner itself seemed to fall 
by implication in Bunting v. Oregon when the Court—amidst a flurry of pro-labor 
decisions202—upheld a ten-hour workday for workers “employed in any mill, factory or 
manufacturing establishment.”203  But the judicial tide would turn swiftly and dramatically in 
                                                 
196 Id.  It is interesting to note Hand’s call for change “either in the Court or in the Constitution” in light of what 
would occur in 1937; undoubtedly a change in the Court, and, some would argue, also a change in the 
Constitution.  See ACKERMAN, supra note ___, at ___.  
197 For contemporary agreement on this point see Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643, 670 (1908). 
198 Tarrow, supra note 136, at 298. 
199 See, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907) (upholding eight hour workday for federal employees); 
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (upholding hours law for female hotel workers); Sturges & Burn Co. v. 
Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913) (upholding child labor law); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) 
(upholding hours law for female laundry workers); Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60 (1907) 
(upholding safety regulations for mines); accord Charles Warren, Progressiveness of the United States Supreme 
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 294-96 (1913). 
200 An Act to amend An Act to Codify, Revise and Amend the Laws Relating to the Judiciary, P.L. 63-224, 38 
Stat. 790 (1914). 
201 Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353, 370 (1915). 
202 See Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (upholding workman’s compensation law); Simpson v. O’Hara, 
243 U.S. 629 (1917) (upholding minimum wage for women); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (upholding 
eight hour workday and minimum wage for railworkers). 
203 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1917); accord Henry Wolf Bikle, Judicial Determination of 
Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6, 12 (1924). 
 36
1920 with the election of Warren Harding, an event that would have profound consequences 
for both due process doctrine and the Court itself.    
Death and old age conspired to give Harding four Supreme Court appointments in his 
shortened presidential term, and he took full advantage of the opportunity to reshape the 
constitutional debate on economic regulation.204  Harding’s appointments (Taft, Sutherland, 
Butler, and Sanford) immediately tilted the balance of the Court back in favor of the liberty of 
contract,205 and it was over the next decade and a half that the “Lochner Era” truly took shape.  
Perhaps most notable was the Court’s opinion in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, which 
resuscitated Lochner while striking down a minimum wage law for women and children in the 
District of Columbia.206  Writing for the majority, Justice George Sutherland went to 
exaggerated lengths to emphasize the presumption of legislative constitutionality before 
settling on a decisive disjunctive: “But, if by clear and indubitable demonstration a statute be 
opposed to the Constitution, we have no choice but to say so.”207  And in marshalling cases 
against the contested law he quoted liberally from Peckham’s opinion in Lochner, conceding 
only that “[s]ubsequent cases in this court have been distinguished from that decision, but the 
principles therein stated have never been disapproved.”208  In dissent, Chief Justice William 
Howard Taft questioned Lochner’s doctrinal viability after Bunting:  “The law [upheld in 
Bunting] covered the whole field of industrial employment and certainly covered the case of 
persons employed in bakeries. … It is [thus] impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting case 
and the Lochner case, and I have always supposed that the Lochner case was thus overruled 
sub silentio.”209  But, even if Bunting had repudiated Lochner, Adkins now turned the tables 
again, as Sutherland returned the liberty of contract to constitutional glory in high rhetorical 
style: “To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution is not to 
strike down the common good, but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole cannot 
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be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberty of its 
constituent members.”210 
 Over the next ten years the Court would hand down several of its more infamous 
Lochner Era decisions, although on close inspection it is difficult to come up with the “nearly 
200” total era cases later scholars would claim.211  Among the better known are Jay Burns 
Baking Co. v. Bryan, which struck down a law regulating the weight of saleable bread loaves, 
and Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co., which invalidated a prohibition on the use of “shoddy” 
as upholstery stuffing.212  The justices also narrowed or closely cabined existing exceptions to 
the doctrine, such as the exemption for businesses “affected with the public interest,”213 and—
perhaps most notably for future generations—began to expand substantive due process 
analysis to include new kinds of fundamental rights.  In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck 
down a prohibition on German language teaching, and Justice James McReynolds gave broad 
texture to an evolving list of Fourteenth Amendment liberties.214  In many ways it is Meyer—
and other “civil liberty” cases likes it215—that would become the fulcrum of later debates 
about Lochner’s metonymic meaning, as commentators tried either to distinguish or conflate 
“good” (civil liberty) and “bad” (economic liberty) Lochnering.216  The financial crash of 
1929 and ensuing depression, however, drew the nation’s focus ineluctably to economic and 
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issues, and the Court’s continuing efforts to preserve libertarian values and the laissez-faire 
market became politically untenable.217   
The history of the Court’s battle with Congress and the Executive between 1930 and 
1937 is well documented, and I will not rehearse it here except to say that, as is true of many 
such narratives, the constitutional canon that began to emerge from the “switch in time that 
saved nine” was something akin to winner’s history.218  Two decisions handed down in 1938 
struck at the very core of the old economic jurisprudence.  United States v. Carolene Products 
fundamentally reoriented the relationship between Congress and the Court such that the 
justices would now presume economic regulations rested “upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators”;219 although in his fourth footnote Justice Harlan 
Stone laid the groundwork for a more active scrutiny of statues infringing on certain civil 
liberties.220  And the foundations of “mechanical jurisprudence”—Pound’s bugaboo—began 
to crumble in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,221 which ended the Court’s longstanding efforts to 
“constitutionalize the categories of the common law.”222  Finally, in 1941—just three days 
after Justice McReynolds (the last of the famed “four horseman”) retired—the new Court 
drove a definitive stake through the heart of the old doctrine with its unanimous opinion in 
United States v. Darby.223  But, even with the death of its era, Lochner itself did not take on 
particular metonymic significance for several decades224—and when the notoriety did come it 
was, again, begun in the academy. 
Perhaps predictably, academic interest in Lochner began to pick up in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, as the Warren Court reinvigorated substantive due process in cases like 
Griswold v. Connecticut225—which explicitly “reaffirm[ed] the principle” of Meyer v. 
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Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters—and Roe v. Wade.226  While the 1965 edition of 
Gerald Gunther’s widely used constitutional law textbook skipped right past Lochner and its 
progeny (going straight from the Slaguhterhouse Cases to Palko v. Connecticut),227 by 1970 
Gunther had put together a new section entitled “Substantive Due Process and Economic 
Regulation: The Rise of Judicial Intervention,” in which he coined, or at least popularized, the 
phrase “Lochner Era.”228  By 1975, developments merited an entire chapter—168 pages in 
length—entitled “Substantive Due Process: Rise, Decline, Revival,” with a lengthy section 
devoted to Lochner.229  In the introduction, Gunther explained a felt need “to contrast more 
sharply the discredited use of [substantive due process] doctrine in an earlier era with its 
modern revival in the abortion and contraception decisions,”230 though he later confided to 
Randy Barnett that he had juxtaposed Lochner with the Warren Court cases in an effort to 
discredit the modern decisions.231  Meanwhile, Robert Bork reached back to Lochner, Meyer, 
Pierce, and Adkins as part of a scathing attack on Griswold, in which he argued that 
substantive due process “is and always has been an improper doctrine … [which] requires the 
Court to say, without guidance from the Constitution, which liberties or gratifications may be 
infringed by majorities and which may not.”232  And in a highly visible essay in the Yale Law 
Journal, John Hart Ely compared Roe to Lochner, emphasizing the latter’s disrepute: “The 
Court continues to disavow the philosophy of Lochner.  Yet … it is impossible candidly to 
regard Roe as the product of anything else.”233  Indeed, Ely suggested that over the long term 
Roe might actually be more “dangerous” than Lochner, in that the modern Court held that 
abortion laws impinged a fundamental or “special” right and were thus subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny—greater constitutional protection than was ever afforded the liberty of 
contract.234 
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On reflection, it is probably unsurprising that it took a change in constitutional 
culture—the revival of substantive due process—to bring Lochner to the fore as an anti-
canonical metonym; after all what is argumentative metonymy without an argument?  But 
once kindled, Lochner’s prominence within constitutional practice grew rapidly.  The real 
“tipping point,” David Bernstein argues, came with the publication of Laurence Tribe’s 
American Constitutional Law in 1978.235  Tribe—probably our most learned living 
doctrinalist—famously broke constitutional analysis down into seven “models,”236 and hailed 
Lochner and its era as the high water mark of the second category: “the model of implied 
limitations on government.”237  As Bernstein points out, throughout a twenty-eight page 
chapter Tribe “consistently us[ed] Lochner as shorthand for all of the Supreme Court’s liberty 
of contract jurisprudence,”238 and the case name itself appears in four of the seven section 
titles.239  But—unlike Gunther, Bork, and Ely before him—Tribe did not analogize the 
Warren Court to the Lochner Era; instead he worked to distinguish the modern substantive 
due process revival from its dishonored roots.240  Indeed, he found no fault in the Lochner 
Court’s willingness to thwart the will of the majority—“surely there can be no general duty on 
the part of a deliberately countermajoritarian body like a court … simply to follow the 
election returns”—arguing rather that the Court’s mistake was “overconfidence” in “its own 
factual notions,” and in failing to recognize “that the economic ‘freedom’ it was protecting 
was more myth than reality.”241 As such, Tribe’s treatment was the first significant academic 
effort to recalibrate Lochner’s conventional metonymic meaning: by his account the epithet 
should not apply to all judicial interference with the legislative prerogative, only to economic 
activism or other “pigheaded” judicial encroachments.242  It is here that we see the process of 
canonical refinement take center stage, as the older progressive Lochner metonym collided 
with new judicial culture of civil and social justice. 
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Bernstein contends that, after Tribe’s treatise, use of the term “Lochner Era” in 
academic discourse “skyrocketed,”243 and my own search of the electronic databases largely 
confirms his assessment.244  But to attribute this circumstance too completely to Tribe’s book 
is probably to underestimate the Court’s own role in fueling Lochner’s growing notoriety.  In 
1977—a year before Tribe—the Court itself used Gunther’s “Lochner Era” terminology for 
the first time in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, which struck down an ordinance that defined 
a “family” narrowly for housing purposes.245  And notably, Justice Lewis Powell’s plurality 
opinion took very much the same view of Lochner’s legacy as would Tribe: 
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this 
Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced 
protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the 
more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the 
Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only 
limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those 
who happen at the time to be Members of this Court. That history 
counsels caution and restraint. But it does not counsel 
abandonment.246 
 
Rather, Powell urged continuing due process recognition for what the latter Justice John 
Marshall Harlan had called “the traditions from which [our nation] developed as well as the 
traditions from which it broke,” and suggested that Meyer and Pierce—but not Lochner—met 
the relevant criteria.247  So it seems that the Court, too, was working to refine Lochner’s 
meaning in an effort to distinguish between good and bad “Lochnering.”  And, with this in 
mind, it was undoubtedly some combination of influence and interplay between the academy 
and the bench that brought the anti-canonical metonym into the modern constitutional era—
but subsequent evolutions in Lochner’s meaning would take place largely in the academy.248 
 In the twelve years following Moore just eighteen federal court opinions—and only 
one Supreme Court opinion—used the phrase “Lochner Era,” and none gave the words any 
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thought or meaning beyond the conventional association with judicial overreach.249  During 
the same period, however, discussion of Lochner exploded in the legal journals.250  The 
debate stretched into the next decade, with conservatives continuing to cast the decision as the 
poisonous root of the resurgent substantive due process tree,251 and liberals building upon 
Tribe’s efforts to refine the metonym and defend the Warren Court.252  On one side, Antonin 
Scalia continued to attack Roe by association, calling it “the most controversial recent 
extension” of Lochnerian jurisprudence,253 while, on the other, John Hart Ely distinguished 
between Lochner’s illegitimate exaltation of economic rights and the Warren Court’s heroic 
efforts to protect the sort of Meiklejohnian democracy-promoting rights described in Carolene 
Products’ fourth footnote.254  Writing shortly after his failed nomination to the Supreme 
Court, an embittered Robert Bork continued to counsel the dangers of any unenumerated due 
process right—whether it be the liberty of contract or the right of privacy: “When the 
Constitution has not spoken, the Court will be able to find no scale, other than its own value 
preferences, upon which to weigh the competing claims.”255  Cass Sunstein, on the other 
hand, tried valiantly to recast Lochner’s metonymic meaning in the mechanical jurisprudence 
tradition, as symbolic of the need for government neutrality and inaction within perceived 
“natural” constructs like the market.256  Understood this way, Sunstein argued that Lochner’s 
“heirs are not Roe v. Wade and Miranda v. Arizona, but instead such decisions as Washington 
v. Davis [and] Buckley v. Valeo.”257  Others, like Bruce Ackerman, challenged the very 
assumption that Lochner was wrongly decided, and argued that its modern infamy simply 
reflects the dramatic changes in constitutional meanings that have occurred since 1905.258  
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Indeed, the literature on Lochner’s legacy grew so large that it began to inspire its own 
literature, to which this discussion is itself, I suppose, a belated addition.259 
 As evidence of this trend, the past decade has seen the publication of such recensionist 
titles as Gary Rowe’s Lochner Revisionism Revisited;260 David Bernstein’s Lochner’s 
Legacy’s Legacy and Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised;261 Jack Balkin’s Lochner and 
Constitutional Historicism;262 and Howard Gillman’s De-Lochnerizing Lochner.263  All of 
this, I suggest, is a compelling demonstration of our continuing efforts to distill constitutional 
meaning and reclaim constitutional high ground along the shifting riverbed of constitutional 
practice.  While sometimes such efforts—such as those targeting Jefferson’s wall of 
separation—aim simply to chip away at a hard spot in the bank with the hope of casting it 
back into the moving stream, at other times we endeavor to preserve the induration, but want 
to reshape it slightly so that it channels the constitutional water in a different direction.  The 
debate surrounding Lochner belongs to the latter category, as the participants (for the most 
part) agree that Lochnering is a constitutional sin, but now fight over exactly what the sin 
entails.  As a result, while Lochner itself was doctrinally repudiated in 1937 (if not before)—
and vilified in nearly all other respects by 1975—in 2003 as esteemed a scholar as David 
Strauss could credibly ask why the case was wrongly decided.264 
For all these reasons, I suggest that Lochner is an excellent example of an anti-
canonical text employed as an argumentative metonym.  It is a decision that—due in large 
part to a concise and powerful dissent—has taken on associated meanings beyond its literal 
text, and our constitutional practice has refined those meanings over time to align with the 
changing culture of constitutional progressivism.  When the Court stood in the way of 
progressive change, Lochnering became a high crime—but later, as the Court took the lead in 
social reform, the elements of the crime required updating.  Interestingly, Lochner also 
provides a compelling demonstration of the legal academy’s impact on metonymic meanings 
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and the construction of the constitutional canon—even within the doctrinal modality.   This is 
certainly not always, nor even usually, the case, as quite often it is the advocates and the 
courts that reshape and realign doctrinal metonyms.  We need look no further than Brown v. 
Board of Education—perhaps the twentieth century’s most canonical piece of doctrine265—
for a powerful illustration of such metonymic evolution accomplished at the bar.  There we 
see a case that once symbolized our national commitment to overcome the worst traditions of 
cultural segregation and racist iniquity refined to represent the kind of “colorblindness” that 
could invalidate a school enrollment program intended to promote racial integration.266  But 
Lochner is evidence that the academy—and, in truth, many spheres of constitutional 
discourse—can also have a profound impact on the constitutional canon and constitutional 
meanings.   Indeed, the final section explores the evolution of metonymic associations within 
the most inclusive and proletarian of constitutional modalities: ethos. 
 
III. ETHOS:  CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 
THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS, AND CANONICAL REFORMATION 
 
In the early 1960s the Supreme Court struggled mightily with issues of legislative 
malapportionment, as a number of outmoded state districting schemes created significant 
disparities in electoral influence.267  In a 1963 case arising out of Georgia, the Court held that 
the Constitution requires states to count rural and urban votes equally, and justified that 
position by reference to, among other texts, the Declaration of Independence and Abraham 
Lincoln’s dedication of a national cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: “The conception of 
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to 
the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one 
person, one vote.”268  The following year, in Reynolds v. Sims—which remains among the 
most important and controversial cases decided last century—the Court gave pride of place to 
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this same language as it carried forward a constitutional argument about the applied meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause.269  But, as every first year law student learns, neither the 
Declaration of Independence nor the Gettysburg Address have any binding legal force, so 
what can these texts possibly tell us about the legitimacy of a constitutional proposition?  The 
answer is, in a word, ethos.  These are canonical statements of the ethos of American 
constitutionalism and democracy, and their appearance is perfectly appropriate within the 
ethical modality of constitutional argument.270  Even ethos, however, is susceptible to change 
and evolution, and this is true of the most canonical texts in the modality.  This section 
examines the Declaration of Independence’s metonymic odyssey through constitutional 
argument over the first century of American life.  In particular, I explore the Declaration’s 
canonical reformation in the political crucible of the Civil War, culminating in Lincoln’s 
dramatic universalization of natural rights at Gettysburg.  Again, however, I begin with a 
description of the Declaration’s meaning in historical context. 
As he lay dying in late June of 1826, Thomas Jefferson reluctantly declined an 
invitation from Washington to join in celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of American 
independence: 
I should indeed, with peculiar delight, have met and exchanged there 
congratulations with the small band, the remnant of that host of 
worthies, who joined with us, on that day, in the bold and doubtful 
election we were to make, for our country, between submission and 
the sword; and to have enjoyed with them the consolatory fact that 
our fellow citizens, after half a century of experience and prosperity, 
continue to approve the choice we made.  May it be to the world what 
I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to 
all) the signal of arousing men to burst the chains, under which 
Monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind 
themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-
government.271 
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Even in his last hours, then, Jefferson showed flashes of the “masterly Pen” that John Adams 
had a half-century before recommended to draft the Declaration of Independence.272  And, in 
one of the great synchronicities of American mythology, both men—their lives inextricably 
entwined from the summer of 1776 onward—would die on the very day of the Declaration’s 
fiftieth anniversary.  Here, at the end, it seems Jefferson hoped to reinforce what he saw as the 
Declaration’s enduring meaning; it had, he thought, “laid open to every view the palpable 
truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored 
few booted and spurred.”273  Yet even as he wrote, black slaves worked the halls and fields of 
Monticello—many remained in bondage after his death—and the institution of slavery stood 
as a stark counterfactual to American political idealism.   
What, then, are we to make of the Declaration’s majestic opening lines, particularly 
the “self-evident” assertion that “all men are created equal … endowed by their creator with 
certain unalienable rights”?274  Did Jefferson, or the Continental Congress, really mean all 
men?  The Declaration is, of course, more than just its soaring preamble, but it is this specific 
question—the metonymic meaning of Jefferson’s most famous phrase—that this section 
explores.  The answer, of course, is complex and controverted, but I begin my account with 
Jefferson himself in the hope of understanding what the enigmatic Virginian understood his 
words to mean.  I then look at the Congress that debated and issued the Declaration, before 
finally investigating the argumentative uses to which these words were put in the next eighty-
seven years of constitutional and political discourse.  I conclude that the phrase came to have 
two meanings: the first aspirational, and the second functional; and that it was only through 
the political calamity of war, made human in the person of Abraham Lincoln, that the two 
were finally fused. 
In considering Jefferson’s personal intentions, it may be useful to begin by examining 
some of the sources from which he drew intellectual inspiration.  Jefferson claimed that he 
“turned to neither book nor pamphlet” when composing his initial draft of the 
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Declaration275—indeed, Adams would later describe the opening sentiments as commonplace 
and “hackneyed in Congress for two years before”276—but we can certainly deduce some of 
the works that helped shape the preamble.  Chief among these must be the first section of 
George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights, which began by asserting that “all men are 
by nature equally free and independent and have certain independent rights.”277  Mason’s 
work formed part of the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which Jefferson himself helped draft, 
and he regarded Mason as the “wisest man of his generation.”278  Further, the Pennsylvania 
Gazette reprinted the Virginia Declaration in Philadelphia on June 12, 1776—right around the 
time Jefferson was writing.279  Mason, in turn, undoubtedly drew on John Locke’s Second 
Treatise of Civil Government, in which the British philosopher claimed that “all men by 
nature are equal,” and that “equal right every man hath to his natural freedom.”280  Indeed, 
Jefferson would later acknowledge his debt to “the elementary books of public right, [such] as 
Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, [and] Sidney” as well as to the “harmonizing sentiments of the 
day.”281  The Philadelphia air, it seems, was thick with talk of natural law and equality. 
The salient question here, of course, is whether Jefferson’s reliance on this spirit and 
these sources can tell us anything meaningful about his intention to include black slaves 
within the Declaration’s opening ambit.  While it is true, and perhaps interesting, that 
Aristotle, Cicero, Mason, (and perhaps Locke and Sidney282) all lived in slave holding 
societies, this is hardly evidence of their views on the practice as a matter of political theory.  
                                                 
275 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1823) in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS ser. 1, reel __. 
276 John Adams, Letter to Thomas Pickering (Aug. 6, 1822) reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 512, 514 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1850). 
277 George Mason, Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) reprinted in FOUNDING THE REPUBLIC: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 52 (John J. Patrick ed., 1995). For a thorough account of Mason’s influence on 
Jefferson’s draft, see R. Carter Pittman, The Declaration of Independence: Its Antecedents and Authors (1953) 
available at: http://rcarterpittman.org/essays/documents/Declaration_of_Independence.html (last visited April 
29, 2009). 
278 KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792 v. 1, ix (1892). 
279 “Williamsburg,” PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, 2, c.1 (June 12, 1776). 
280 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, CHAP. VI, SEC. 54 (1690) reprinted in JOHN LOCKE, 
THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (J. W. Gough ed., 
1946). 
281 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Henry Lee, Jr. (May 8, 1825) in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, ser. 1, reel __.  
Robert Pittman disputes this claim, arguing that Jefferson relied heavily on William Henry Drayton’s preamble 
to the South Carolina Constitution of 1776 and a grand jury charge he issued as Chief Justice the same year.  See 
Pittman, supra note 277. 
282 The feudal forms largely replaced outright slavery in England by the end of the thirteenth century, see 
CHARLES A. BAKER, THE COMPANION TO BRITISH HISTORY 1145 (2d ed., 2001), but during Sidney and Locke’s 
time some African slaves were brought to the island until the practice was essentially ended with Lord 
Mansfield’s opinion in Somerset’s Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). 
 48
Mason, though he owned a large number of slaves, openly denounced the institution,283 while 
Aristotle plainly believed some people were born to serve.284  Locke thought contractual 
slavery was against the law of nature, but he believed that the practice might appropriately 
exist “between a lawful conqueror and his captive”285 when slaves “taken in a just war, are by 
the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters.”286 
Sidney had some contradictory things to say on the topic, but he did proclaim that there exists 
“no such thing in nature as a slave.”287  Cicero, for his part, both owned slaves and thought of 
the institution in very Aristotelian terms: “[W]hen those are slaves who cannot govern 
themselves, there is no injury done.”288 On balance, these considerations might suggest that 
Jefferson accepted slavery as a necessary exception to—or perhaps even an essential part of—
natural law political theory.  But Jefferson’s mere familiarity with philosophical justifications, 
of course, proves very little about his personal thoughts on the American institution and its 
place in the Declaration’s embodied political ideology.  If anything, we might reasonably 
conclude that Jefferson’s own convictions were closest to Mason’s, for whom he had great 
affinity.  Indeed, more compelling evidence suggests that slavery was very much on his mind 
in Philadelphia, and that he thought the slave trade, at least, anathema to the natural order. 
 Jefferson’s original draft of the Declaration included among its list of grievances 
against George III the charge that:  
He has waged cruel War against human Nature itself, violating its 
most sacred Rights of Life and Liberty in the Persons of a distant 
People who never offended him, captivating and carrying them in 
Slavery to another Hemisphere, or to incur miserable Death in their 
Transportation thither.  This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of 
infidel powers, is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain.  
Determined to keep open a market where Men should be bought and 
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sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative 
attempt to prohibit or to restrain his execrable commerce.  And that 
this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he 
is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to 
purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the 
people on whom he has also obtruded them: thus paying off former 
crimes committed against the Liberties of one people, with crimes he 
urges them to commit against the lives of another.289 
 
This language, later struck in Congress, is certainly consistent with Jefferson’s more general 
thoughts on slavery as an institution.  In his Notes on the State of Virginia, written just a few 
years later, Jefferson lamented the destructive effects on both master and subject of “a 
perpetual exercise of the … most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading 
submissions on the other.”290  And, as a matter of political theory, he clearly thought the 
practice a violation of natural law: “[C]an the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we 
have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties 
are the gift of God?”291  From this evidence, then, it would seem Jefferson did not share the 
Aristotelian view of a natural condition of slavery. 
 Yet there is other language in the Notes that has led some historians to argue that 
Jefferson did not view black men as nearly the equal of whites.292  In a long passage exploring 
a proposal to abolish slavery in Virginia and recolonize blacks elsewhere, he discussed the 
relative merits of the races, and, in general, seemed to find blacks inferior.293  In particular, he 
thought little of the black intellect: “[I]n reason [blacks are] much inferior, as I think one 
could scarcely be found capable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of Euclid; 
and … in imagination they are dull, tasteless and anomalous.”294  He attributed some of these 
shortcomings to the oppressions of slavery, but overall he concluded that “their inferiority is 
not the effect merely of their condition of life.”295  But his judgments were not entirely 
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disparaging, and in particular he believed that “in [endowments] of the heart [Nature] will be 
found to have done them justice.”296  While this may seem a hollow concession to the modern 
reader, Garry Wills insightfully argues that, given Jefferson’s grounding in Scottish common-
sense philosophy, we should understand his reference to the “heart” as real praise for blacks’ 
ability to feel and act upon the moral sentiments: “[W]hen Jefferson says that blacks are equal 
to whites in ‘benevolence, gratitude, and unshaken fidelity,’ he is listing the cardinal virtues 
of moral-sense theory, the central manifestations of man’s highest faculty.”297 Thus, Wills 
contends that Jefferson actually judged the races literally equal in the most deeply significant 
way: “For him, accidental differences of body and mind were dwarfed by an all-important 
equality in the governing faculty of man.”298  And it was this faculty above all others that 
gave blacks an equal claim, in Jefferson’s mind, to the natural rights of mankind. 
 On balance, then, I think it is safe to conclude that Jefferson did intend to include 
blacks within the scope of the Declaration’s sweeping statement of equality.  Both his polemic 
against the King’s support of the slave trade and his broader disapprobation for the American 
practice suggest that he saw no place for the institution in a just political theory.  Even his 
explicit assertions of racial inferiority—no matter how jarring they may be to modern ears—
hardly demonstrate that Jefferson believed blacks had a lesser claim to equality at law.  
Rather, he thought that equal possession of the moral senses gave blacks every right to equal 
standing in the political community.  And certainly he was not alone in these beliefs among 
the Declaration’s signers—John Adams and James Wilson spring instantly to mind299—but, 
just as certainly, he knew that not all members of the Continental Congress shared his views.  
Indeed, it is in turning our attention to the Congress that issued the Declaration that we can 
begin to make out the preamble’s divergent aspirational and functional meanings. 
 As instructive as the original condemnation of the slave trade is in assessing 
Jefferson’s intentions when drafting the Declaration, the decision to omit the impassioned 
language from the final document reveals even more about Congress’s understanding of the 
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lofty exordium.  Unfortunately, there is little primary record of the debates in Congress over 
the Declaration’s final language, though a comparison of Jefferson’s original draft (or at least 
the copy he gave to John Adams beforehand) and the ratified version shows a number of 
significant alterations.300  While it is clear that some of these occurred within the drafting 
committee—which consisted of Jefferson, Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and 
Robert Livingston—the grievance against the slave trade was removed in Congress.301  The 
best contemporary descriptions of the Congressional debates are Jefferson’s own Notes on the 
Proceedings in Congress, which he seems to have taken during the summer of 1776, and then 
sent in refined form to James Madison in 1783.302  Of the passage on slavery, he wrote the 
following: 
The clause, too, reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa, 
was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who 
had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on 
the contrary still wished to continue it.  Our Northern brethren also I 
believe felt a little tender under those censures; for though their 
people have very few slaves themselves yet they had been pretty 
considerable carriers of them to others.303 
 
In truth, it was excruciating for Jefferson to see any of his language altered, but this particular 
omission was among those he most regretted.304  Indeed, Virginian Richard Henry Lee tried to 
soothe Jefferson by expressing his wish “for the honor of Congress, as for that of the States, 
that the manuscript had not been mangled as it is.”305  But Jefferson well understood the 
political realities of the colonial alliance, and the deletion of the passage on slavery cannot 
have come as any great surprise; for, as he trenchantly observed in explaining his Notes, “the 
sentiments of men are known not only by what they receive, but what they reject also.”306 
 As the bulk of Jefferson’s account makes clear, Congress’s principal motivation for 
issuing the Declaration was the hope that formal independence might make French financial 
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and military support possible.  Fully a third of the objections Jefferson ascribes to Robert 
Livingston, Edward Rutledge and the Pennsylvania delegation address the perceived 
inefficacy of the Declaration as an enticement of foreign aid.307  A representative criticism 
suggested that “foreign powers would either refuse to join themselves to our fortunes, or 
having us so much in their power as that desperate declaration would place us, they would 
insist on terms proportionally more hard and prejudicial.”308  Conversely, John Adams and the 
Virginia delegation argued that “a declaration of Independence alone could render it 
consistent with European delicacy for European powers to treat with us, or even to receive an 
Ambassador from us”—and, indeed, the “only misfortune is that we did not enter into an 
alliance with France six months sooner.”309  With such pressing foreign policy concerns at 
hand, it is understandable that Congress thought it an inopportune time to contemplate or 
debate the natural law implications of black slavery.  For Congress, the Declaration was 
meant to serve a pragmatic and very political function, and it did that well.  As Pauline Maier 
has observed, “By exercising their intelligence [and] political good sense … the delegates 
managed to make the Declaration more accurate and more consonant with the convictions of 
their constituents.”310  And certainly not all of those constituents shared Jefferson’s 
aspirations for the legal equality of African slaves.311  Thus, I think it is ultimately safe to 
ascribe to Congress a functional understanding of the preamble’s language: while some 
delegates certainly aspired to universal human equality, the assembly as a whole was content 
at that time to stake its claim only to the equal rights of Englishmen.312 
 Returning to my descriptivist project, I think the use of the Declaration’s preamble as 
an argumentative metonym over the next seventy-five years of constitutional discourse 
provides ample evidence of its different functional and aspirational meanings.  In the early 
years of the Union, the Declaration had not yet achieved the canonical status that was to 
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come,313 but it did make sporadic appearances in Congressional debates on slavery—
primarily to buttress aspirational kinds of arguments.  In 1789, Virginian Josiah Parker 
invoked “the pure beneficence of the doctrine we hold out to the world on our Declaration of 
Independence” in a failed push for a tax on slave importations.314  The following year, New 
Jersey’s Elias Boudinot rose in support of a Quaker remonstrance against slavery—which, 
too, failed to garner much support—quoting the language of Jefferson’s preamble.315    And 
sixteen years later, as efforts got underway to prohibit the slave trade at the first constitutional 
opportunity, Pennsylvanian John Smilie appealed to “the principles of 1776, which have 
indeed been since laughed at, but which are now beginning, I hope, to be held in universal 
estimation”; and then read aloud Jefferson’s list of self-evident truths.316  Interestingly, 
however, it was in response to Smilie that fellow Pennsylvanian Joseph Clay began explicitly 
to trace the outlines of the functionalist metonym:   
The Declaration of Independence is to be taken with a great 
qualification.  It declares those men have an inalienable right to life; 
yet we hang criminals—to liberty, yet we imprison—to the pursuit of 
happiness, yet he must not infringe on the rights of others.  If the 
Declaration of Independence is taken in its fullest extent, it will 
warrant robbery and murder, for some may think even those crimes 
necessary to their happiness.317 
 
Clay, of course, rather missed Smilie’s point—which decried slavery as a hereditary status—
but the general thrust of his argument for a “qualifi[ed]” understanding of the preamble would 
take center stage in 1819, as slavery dominated the debate over Missouri’s admission to the 
Union. 
 The controversy began in February of 1819, when New York Representative James 
Tallmadge moved to amend a pending bill on Missouri’s admission “to limit the existence of 
slavery in the new State, by declaring all free who should be born in the Territory after its 
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admission into the Union.”318  The constitutional question Tallmadge’s amendment posed—
whether Congress had the power to condition admission upon a restriction of slavery—
admitted no ready textual, historical, or doctrinal answer, and so several delegates turned to 
ethical argument and invoked the Declaration as “an authority admitted in all parts of the 
Union [as] a definition of the basis of republican government.”319 With this in mind 
Massachusetts’ Timothy Fuller suggested that, by the light of the preamble, a slaveholding 
Missouri could not satisfy the Constitution’s Republican Government Clause, as “it cannot be 
denied that slaves are men, it follows that they are in a purely republican government born 
free, and are entitled to liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”320  Several Southern delegates 
immediately objected that such an interpretation would call into question “the republican 
character of [any of] the slaveholding States,”321 and Fuller’s response clearly delineates the 
Declaration’s functional and aspirational meanings in constitutional law: 
The predominant principle … is that all men are free and have an 
equal right to liberty, and to all other privileges; or, in other words, 
the predominant principle is republicanism, in its largest sense.  But, 
then, the same compact contains certain exceptions.  The States then 
holding slaves are permitted, from the necessity of the case, and for 
the sake of union, to exclude republican principles so far, and only so 
far, as to retain their slaves in servitude, and also their progeny, as had 
been the usage, until they should think it proper or safe to conform to 
the pure principle by abolishing slavery.322 
 
Congress adjourned in March, and when it reconvened the following December the proslavery 
faction had had time to develop and build upon these functionalist arguments.323  
 Maryland Senator William Pinkney, for example, expressed the view that, “The self-
evident truths announced in the Declaration of Independence are not truths at all, if taken 
literally.”324  Though the reporter’s notes do not record Pinkney’s speech, New Hampshire 
Senator David Moril summarized his view in opposing it: “[W]hat does the gentlemen say? 
‘That all men are created equal’ is absurd, because one is born poor, one to inherit a fortune—
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one a peasant, another a prince—one a slave, another a freeman.”325  And Pennsylvania 
Senator Jonathan Roberts attributed to Pinkney the view “that the self-evident truths set forth 
in the Declaration of Independence are not, as we understand them, the foundation of all our 
principles of law, but merely abstract aphorisms, which have but limited meaning.”326  This 
functionalist sentiment met with stiff opposition from anti-slavery advocates—with Senator 
Moril rejoining, “I presume the equality intended does not consist in the fortune [men] may 
enjoy, or the rank they may hold in society, but in the inalienable right with which every one 
is indued”327—but the proslavery voices persisted.  Indeed, Virginian Representative Andrew 
Smyth took the attack on the aspirational Declaration a step further by arguing that the 
document actually militated against any limitations on slavery: 
[The Continental Congress] asserted that man cannot alienate his 
liberty, nor by compact deprive his posterity of liberty.  Slaves are not 
held as having alienated their liberty by compact.  They are held 
under the law and usage of nations, from the remotest times of which 
we have any historical knowledge, and by the municipal laws of the 
States, over which the Congress of 1776, and this Congress have not, 
any control.  We agree with the Congress of 1776, that men, on 
entering into society, cannot alienate their right to liberty and 
property, and that they cannot, by compact, bind their posterity.  And, 
therefore, we contend that the people of Missouri cannot alienate their 
rights, or bind their posterity by a compact with Congress.328 
 
Here, then, is an extreme version of the functionalist Declaration—one which rejects the 
aspirational reading entirely—accomplished in two parts: first, the equality language does not 
refer to slaves, who have been outside of society since time immemorial; and, second, natural 
law prevents one generation from imposing any restrictions on the next’s right to hold 
property.  Read this way—and many proslavery delegates were happy to accept the 
invitation—Jefferson’s preamble actually protected Missouri whites by ensuring them an 
equal “right to alter, to amend, [or] to abolish their constitution[].”329 
 In the end the more modest functionalist Declaration won out, as evidenced in the 
Missouri Compromise.  The arrangement admitted Missouri without a restriction on slavery, 
                                                 
325 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 296 (1820). 
326 Id. at 341. 
327 Id. at 296. 
328 Id. at 1005 (emphasis added). 
329 Id. at 1384.  John Tyler (Va.), Louis McClane (De.), and Richard Johnson (Ky.) were among those who 
pressed Smyth’s argument further.  See, Detweiler, supra note 312, at 609-10. 
 56
brought in Maine as a free state, and prohibited the expansion of slavery into the remaining 
portion of the Louisiana Purchase north of Missouri’s southern border.330  As such, the 
Compromise reflected Northern aspirations for the gradual elimination of slavery, but, as a 
political matter, conceded the functional need for a delicate balance of slave and free states.  
As then-Representative John Tyler explained in cautioning against the too-literal application 
of natural law aspirations, “Liberty and equality are captivating sounds; but they often 
captivate to destroy.”331  And, as the St. Louis Enquirer sagely observed of life in Missouri 
after the Compromise,  
Our declaration of rights tells us “all men are born equal,” that is, are 
entitled to equal rights . . . . This truth entitles every slave to his 
freedom, and that without delay—but will those who have these 
words continually within [their] mouths be willing to go so far?  No, 
necessity, policy, expediency, etc. forbid.332 
 
The extreme functionalist account—which saw the Declaration protecting slaveholder’s 
rights—lived on in proslavery thought, and eventually made a significant reappearance in the 
Supreme Court.333  But over most of the next three decades some version of the moderate 
functional interpretation held sway, as Congress engaged in increasingly Ptolemaic gyrations 
to preserve the Union.  By no means, however, did the aspirational reading disappear 
altogether.  Indeed, it remained alive and vibrant in the rhetoric and politics of other social 
movements.  
 Over that time, a number of activist groups wrote their own, alternative versions of the 
Declaration of Independence, many adapting Jefferson’s preamble expressly to include their 
own communities.334  In 1829, George Henry Evans authored the first such effort—The 
Working Men’s Declaration of Independence—on behalf of the New York Working Man’s 
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Party.335  Published in the Working Man’s Advocate, Evans’s Declaration began, “’When in 
the course of human events, it becomes necessary’ for one class of a community to assert their 
natural and unalienable rights in opposition to other classes of their fellow men,” and then 
proceeded to intersperse quotations from Jefferson with his own, class-oriented language.336  
A similar appeal to the aspirational Declaration emerged five years later from an association 
of trade unions in Boston.337  The Declaration of Rights of the Trades’ Union of Boston and 
Vicinity announced that, “With the Fathers of our Country, we hold that all men are created 
free and equal” and condemned all “laws which have a tendency to raise any peculiar class 
above their fellow citizens.”338  In 1844, farm and homestead advocate Lewis Masquerier 
drew up a Declaration of Independence of the Producing from the Non-Producing Class, 
which held “these truths to be self-evident: That as the natural wants and powers of 
production of all men are nearly equal, all should be producers as well as consumers.”339  And 
perhaps the best-known alternative Declaration came out of the Women’s Rights Convention 
in Seneca Falls, New York in July of 1848.340  Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s Declaration of 
Sentiments and Resolutions galvanized the emerging women’s movement with a list of 
grievances against patriarchy, and with her famous addition to Jefferson’s original language: 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal.”341 
 These adoptions and adaptations reveal just how alive the aspirational Declaration 
remained in the American mind, but they also demonstrate that the prevailing functional 
account left many marginalized groups feeling excluded from the ideal.  And this exclusion 
remained most obvious and controversial in the case of black slaves.  Indeed, by the 1850s the 
political tension over slavery had grown so extreme that even the qualified Declaration could 
no longer serve much functional purpose.  In January of 1854, Illinois Senator Stephen 
Douglas proposed a bill aimed at making Chicago the eastern terminus of future railroad 
extension into the western territories.342  To carry his bill—part of which organized the 
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unsettled portions of the Louisiana Purchase into the Kansas and Nebraska territories—
Douglas needed the support of southern congressmen, and as a result he made a series of 
fateful concessions to slave interests.343  The final version of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, as it 
came to be known, eviscerated the Missouri Compromise by eliminating the prohibition on 
slavery in the Louisiana territories, and aroused such intense sectional animosity that it 
seemed to set the nation on an inevitable road to civil war.344  And it was in this fractured and 
volatile political context that Chief Justice Roger Taney set out to destroy the aspirational 
Declaration of Independence once and for all with his opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.345 
 Dred Scott, a slave owned by Dr. John Emerson and his family, sued for his freedom 
in Missouri state court based on his travels with Emerson to free soil in both Illinois and the 
Wisconsin Territory.346  Scott won his freedom from a Missouri jury, but lost it again on 
appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court.347  He then filed suit in the Federal Circuit Court in St. 
Louis, and ultimately took his appeal to the United States Supreme Court.348  The threshold 
issue in federal court—whether Scott was a constitutional “citizen” for diversity jurisdiction 
purposes—put the scope of the Declaration’s preamble squarely in question; and Taney 
answered in no uncertain terms.349  He began by referencing a “fixed and universal” history 
that regarded blacks as “beings of an inferior order” who were “altogether unfit to associate 
with the white race, either in social or political relations.”350  In Taney’s reckoning, it was 
traditionally thought that blacks were “so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white 
man was bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery 
for his benefit.”351  He then explicitly reconciled this historical interpretation with the 
Declaration of Independence in a passage that is worth quoting at length: 
The general words quoted above [“all men are created equal”] would 
seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a 
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similar instrument today they would be so understood.  But it is too 
clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to 
be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and 
adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, 
would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who 
framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and 
flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; ….  Yet the 
men who framed this declaration were great men—high in literary 
acquirements—high in their sense of honor, and incapable of 
asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were 
acting.  They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they 
used, and how it would be understood by others; and they knew it 
would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace 
the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from 
civilized Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to 
slavery.352 
 
Taney thus denied that the Declaration had ever had any aspirational meaning at all, and 
imputed this same understanding to the Constitutional Convention.  He easily concluded, 
therefore, that Scott “was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of 
the United States.”353 
 This conclusion did not, as one might expect, draw a close to the opinion.  Rather, 
Taney—perhaps under pressure from new President James Buchanan354—went on to address 
the merits of Scott’s claim and, by extension, the federal government’s power to restrict 
slavery in the territories.355  Taney creatively interpreted Congress’s Article IV authority to 
“make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to 
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the United States”356 as extending only to those territories that belonged to the United States 
at the time of ratification,357 and, finding no other power over slavery in the text, concluded 
that Congress lacked legislative authority to restrict the practice.358  This conclusion voided 
the Missouri Compromise’s prohibition on slavery—already largely repealed by statute—as a 
matter of constitutional law, and Taney (and Buchanan) hoped it would finally put an end to 
the intensifying calls for federalized abolition.  They could not have been more wrong, of 
course, as the decision only provoked greater outrage and indignation among anti-slavery 
advocates.  In particular, Taney’s determined effort to bury the aspirational Declaration of 
Independence drew inspired criticism from an up and coming Senatorial candidate in Illinois.  
Indeed, Abraham Lincoln would make the Declaration’s universal promise one of the focal 
points of his campaign against incumbent Senator Stephan Douglas.359 
 Speaking against the Dred Scott decision in Springfield, Illinois in the spring of 1857, 
Lincoln challenged Taney’s (and Douglas’s) contention that the Declaration served no nobler 
purpose than to effect a formal separation from Britain—that, in essence, it had no 
aspirational meaning.360  Lincoln saw the preamble very differently, and offered his own 
account of the Continental Congress’s intentions: 
They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all men were 
then enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it 
immediately upon them.  In fact they had no power to confer such a 
boon.  They simply meant to declare the right, so that the enforcement 
of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.  They meant 
to set up a standard maxim for a free society, which should be 
familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly 
labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly 
approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its 
influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all 
people of all colors everywhere.  The assertion that “all men are 
created equal” was of no practical use in effecting our separation from 
Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that, but 
for future use. Its authors meant it to be, thank God, it is now proving 
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itself, a stumbling block to those who in after times might seek to turn 
a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism.361  
 
He went on to ridicule Douglas’s recent public claim that the Declaration spoke only of 
“British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in Great 
Britain.”362  Lincoln held up Douglas’s speech and invited the crowd to “read that carefully 
over some leisure hour, and ponder well upon it—see what a mere wreck—a mangled ruin—it 
makes of our once glorious Declaration.”363   And from these beginnings, the competing 
accounts of the Declaration would feature prominently in the vigorous and storied campaign 
debates of the following year. 
 In nearly all of their seven debates, from Ottawa in August to Alton in October, 
Douglas repeated the same charge—often in the same words—against Lincoln:  “[He] reads 
from the Declaration of Independence that all men were created equal, and then asks how can 
you deprive a negro of that equality which God and the Declaration of Independence award to 
him?”364  To Douglas, Lincoln and “all of the little Abolition orators” were simply wrong, and 
the appropriate interpretation was barbarically clear:  
For one, I am opposed to negro citizenship in any and every form. I 
believe this government was made on the white basis. I believe it was 
made by white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity 
forever, and I am in favor of confining citizenship to white men, men 
of European birth and descent, instead of conferring it upon negroes, 
Indians, and other inferior races.365 
 
Lincoln was, in truth, initially measured and politic in his responses.  In northern Illinois, at 
places like Freeport and Ottawa, he felt comfortable saying “there is no reason in the world 
why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of 
Independence,”366 while in more southern cities like Jonesboro and Charleston he conceded 
that “while [the races] remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and 
I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white 
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race.”367  But, as the debates neared their conclusion in Galesburg and Alton, Douglas’s 
attacks grew more intense, and in response Lincoln began to return to the aspirational 
principles he had defended a year earlier in Springfield. 
 At Galesburg on October 7, Douglas made his most impassioned case yet against the 
aspirational Declaration: 
I tell you that this Chicago doctrine of Lincoln's—declaring that the 
negro and the white man are made equal by the Declaration of 
Independence and by Divine Providence—is a monstrous heresy. The 
signers of the Declaration of Independence never dreamed of the 
negro when they were writing that document. . . . Now, do you 
believe—are you willing to have it said—that every man who signed 
the Declaration of Independence declared the negro his equal, and 
then was hypocrite enough to hold him as a slave, in violation of what 
he believed to be the divine law?368 
 
In response that day, Lincoln asserted that “the entire records of the world … may be searched 
in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man, that the negro was not included in the 
Declaration of Independence”;369 a claim he fleshed out in more detail—and with more 
confidence and venom—the following week at Alton: 
At Galesburg the other day, I said, in answer to Judge Douglas, that 
three years ago there never had been a man, so far as I knew or 
believed, in the whole world, who had said that the Declaration of 
Independence did not include negroes in the term “all men.”  I 
reassert it today.  I assert that Judge Douglas and all his friends may 
search the whole records of the country, and it will be a matter of 
great astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that one human 
being three years ago had ever uttered the astounding sentiment that 
the term “all men” in the Declaration did not include the negro.  Do 
not let me be misunderstood.  I know that more than three years ago 
there were men who, finding this assertion constantly in the way of 
their schemes to bring about the ascendancy and perpetuation of 
slavery, denied the truth of it. . . .  But I say, with a perfect knowledge 
of all this hawking at the Declaration without directly attacking it, that 
three years ago there never had lived a man who had ventured to 
assail it in the sneaking way of pretending to believe it and then 
asserting it did not include the negro.  I believe the first man who ever 
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said it was Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to 
him was our friend, Stephen A. Douglas.  And now it has become the 
catchword of the entire party.370 
 
This, then, is the Lincoln that emerged from the debates with Stephen Douglas: the man 
whom, though unsuccessful in his Senate bid, would assume the Presidency just two years 
later, as the nation teetered on the edge of civil war.  And this—the consolidation and 
universalization of the aspirational Declaration of Independence—was among the core 
convictions of purpose that he carried with him into that office. 
 Without rehearsing the well-known vagaries of the early Civil War, it is sufficient to 
say that, by the summer of 1863, Lincoln actively sought an opportunity to ground the 
numbing human sacrifices of battle in a profound—indeed, a sacred371—statement of 
constitutional purpose.  In September of 1862, after the Battle of Antietam, he had issued a 
preliminary proclamation threatening to free the slaves in those rebellious states that did not 
desist by year’s end,372 and specific enforcement had followed on January 1, 1863.373  But 
these were essentially military and political documents, aimed at swaying British sentiment in 
favor of the Union cause,374 and not the kind of ethical statement required for the canonical 
reformation that Lincoln desired.  That summer, however, the cataclysmic bloodletting at 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania—culminating in Confederate Major General George Pickett’s ill-
fated charge up Cemetery Ridge—would provide Lincoln the opportunity to reaffirm on 
hallowed ground the aspirational meaning of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. 
 Left to clean up the grisly aftermath of three days of horrific battle,375 Pennsylvania 
Governor Andrew Curtin charged Gettysburg banker David Wills with the task of giving 
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 64
proper burial to the thousands of abandoned bodies.376  Wills formed an interstate fundraising 
commission, took bids on reburial costs, ordered caskets from the War Department, and hired 
landscape architect William Saunders to design a National Cemetery on seventeen acres of 
new public land.377  In September, he invited former Harvard President, Senator, and 
Secretary of State Edward Everett to deliver an oration in November dedicating the site; and 
two months later he asked President Lincoln also to give “a few appropriate remarks” on the 
occasion.378  Lincoln took the invitation very seriously, and, leaving his nearly hysterical wife 
in Washington with a sick child (and one recently buried), made his way into a crowded 
Gettysburg on November 18; a day before the ceremony.379  That evening he offered some 
brief comments to a small crowd gathered at his door: 
I appear before you, fellow citizens, merely to thank you for this 
compliment.  The inference is a very fair one that you would hear me 
for a little while at least, were I to commence to make a speech.  I do 
not appear before you for the purpose of doing so, and for several 
substantial reasons.  The most substantial of these is that I have no 
speech to make. [Laughter.]  In my position it is somewhat important 
that I should not say foolish things  [A Voice: If you can help it!]  It 
very often happens that the only way to help it is to say nothing at all. 
[Laughter.]  Believing that is my present condition this evening, I 
must beg of you to excuse me from addressing you further.380 
 
Lincoln—never fond of extemporaneous speaking in his capacity as President—was 
profoundly conscious of the significance his words could have at that time and place, and thus 
he wanted to spend time polishing his remarks for the next day.381 
 There is perhaps more myth and heroic narrative surrounding Lincoln’s preparation of 
the Gettysburg Address than there is of any other canonical text.  Years later Mary Shipman 
Andrews would make famous the story of a haggard President scribbling with a broken pencil 
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on a scrap of wrapping paper aboard the train to Pennsylvania.382  Other accounts insist that 
he wrote it on the back of an envelope at Wills house, or, better yet, composed it on the spot 
as he listened to Everett’s oration.383  The truth is difficult to nail down, but various surviving 
drafts indicate that he had at least written a version of the speech before leaving 
Washington,384 and in all likelihood Lincoln constructed and polished the text as carefully and 
precisely as was his usual custom.385  But, whatever the case, after Everett’s long and learned 
oration, the President rose and, in his high-pitched Kentucky drawl, delivered the brief 
address that, as George Anastaplo has said, “remains the most distinctive distillation of 
Lincoln’s ‘political religion’”:386 
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this 
continent a new Nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal.  Now we are engaged in a 
great civil war, testing whether that Nation or any Nation so 
conceived and so dedicated can long endure.   
We are met on a great battlefield of that war.  We are met to dedicate 
a portion of it as the final resting place of those who here gave their 
lives that that nation might live.  It is altogether fitting and proper that 
we should do this.   
But in a larger sense we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we 
cannot hallow this ground.  The brave men living and dead who 
struggled here have consecrated it far above our power to add or 
detract.  The world will little note nor long remember what we say 
here, but it can never forget what they did here.  It is for us, the living, 
rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus 
far so nobly carried on.  It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the 
great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take 
increased devotion to that cause for which they here gave their last 
full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that the dead 
shall not have died in vain; that the nation shall, under God, have a 
new birth of freedom; and that Government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.387  
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In just his first two sentences, Lincoln codified and immortalized the aspirational Declaration 
of Independence, and, perhaps more importantly, made it the ideological stakes of the Civil 
War: the winner’s Declaration prevails.  It was, after all, eighty-seven years after the signing 
of that document—not the ratification of the Constitution—that he took the stage in 
Gettysburg and recommitted us to Jefferson’s ideal; and it was this “Nation so conceived” that 
was on trial by fire.   
There is some debate about the address’s immediate reception,388 and it is evident that 
not every listener found it compelling.389  But Edward Everett, for one, told Lincoln that his 
brief remarks had likely surpassed his own two-hour oration,390 and there is now no serious 
doubt that Lincoln was mistaken when he claimed “[t]he world will little note nor long 
remember what we say here.”391  Indeed, contrary to the President’s noble sentiment, one 
could credibly argue that more Americans today are familiar with the Gettysburg Address 
than know of Pickett’s Charge, Little Round Top, or the Peach Orchard.  As one historian has 
put it, “Many of us who know [the Address by heart] could not tell where Gettysburg is nor 
when the battle was fought.”392  This is because it is the speech, and not the battle, that 
symbolizes the canonical reformation of the Declaration of Independence.  It is the 
Gettysburg Address as an ethical metonym—fused in war with Jefferson’s preamble—that 
recanonized the aspirational Declaration and recommitted us to universal human equality.  
This is not to say, of course, that the aspiration was then, is now, or ever will be realized.  But 
it is to say that it is the American aspiration; there is no longer any recourse to the functional 
Declaration, and the aspirational metonym has set up very firmly indeed in the constitutional 
riverbed.  And it is thanks to this process of canonical reformation—this “new birth of 
freedom”—that we know exactly where the Supreme Court is pointing us when it invokes 
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I hope the preceding examples successfully illustrate three distinct kinds of canonical 
evolution in constitutional argument—decanonization, canonical refinement, and canonical 
reformation—which may roughly correspond to the familiar doctrinal practices of 
repudiating, distinguishing, and extending common law precedent.  I further hope that I have 
demonstrated that this evolution is internal to the forms of argument themselves, as practiced 
within the existing spheres of constitutional discourse, and that is not the result of some 
external change in circumstances either in the world or in the texts. Finally and most 
importantly, I hope that my descriptive efforts offer practitioners some insight into the types 
of argument that can produce changes in canonical and constitutional meaning over the long 
term.  And I would be gratified if, along the way, I shed perhaps a little new light on—or at 
least refreshed the memory of—old and familiar constitutional narratives.  With all that said, 
however, I want to devote my concluding paragraphs to reviewing the (perhaps esoteric) 
theory underlying my efforts, and to discussing the implications and value of understanding 
canonical texts as argumentative metonyms. 
One of Wittgenstein’s fundamental purposes in the Philosophical Investigations was 
to reject the search for a single unified (or unitary) account of language’s internal logic, which 
had occupied the bulk of his only other published work: the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus.394  Rather, the later Wittgenstein suggested that language is not one activity, 
but a variety of different kinds of activities, each with different rules and purposes.395  Across 
the spectrum of these myriad “language-games,” the same word often serves a variety of 
different—though related—functions, each specific to the particular “game” within which it is 
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employed.396  From this it follows that a word’s meaning is not derived from some 
foundational referent in the world, but rather is determined by the use to which it is properly 
put within a particular language-game.397  The “properly” part is critical, for it precludes the 
impossible suggestion that a word can mean whatever we want to use it to mean, and instead 
grounds the generalized claim that “the meaning of a word is its use” in a more specific 
account of what it is to understand and follow the rules of a language-game.398  Without 
getting too deeply into Wittgenstein’s complex and controverted theory of how we identify, 
understand, and follow these rules, it is essential to remember that obeying a rule is also a 
social practice and “[h]ence it is not possible to obey a rule privately.”399  We can only know 
that we have successfully followed a rule—that we know how to use a word and thus what it 
means—when our usage is successfully understood, or “ratified”, by another participant in the 
particular language-game.400  But, as elements of a practice, the rules themselves will evolve 
as contexts and purposes change, and as individual participants leave their impact on the 
game.   It is in something like this way that meanings change over time.401 
Philip Bobbitt has thoughtfully applied some of these insights about the nature of 
language to another contextualized social practice: constitutional law.  He has suggested that 
we should understand the Constitution itself as analogous to a Wittgensteinian language-
game—complete with its own internal rules or grammar—and that we must ground assertions 
of constitutional meaning (if they are to be legitimate) in the proper forms of argument and 
usage.  I have tried here to give some account of how we interact with particular kinds of 
terms—canonical texts—in building these arguments, and of how these terms’ meaning can 
change over time as we engage in the practices of constitutional law.  This account builds on 
some of Wittgenstein’s last thoughts about the nature of certainty, empiricism, and 
foundationalism, and uses his analogy of the river and its bed to explore the relationship 
between the constitutional canon and constitutional practice.  My contention is that, while a 
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competent constitutional practitioner must remain within the canonical riverbed when 
constructing modal arguments, she may in turn—through perhaps subtle alterations in 
usage—reshape the constitutional geology over time.  Importantly, this is not to suggest (in 
some crude realist sense) that a canonical text means whatever an advocate or judge uses it to 
mean at any particular place and time.   We still must follow the rules, and our usages must be 
understood and ratified within the relevant community, for us to make any legitimate 
assertion of constitutional meaning.  The claim is rather that, as creative individual actors 
within a much larger creative practice, we can impact and grow the rules of the language-
game over time, thus changing the ways that canonical texts are appropriately used and 
understood. 
One might still wonder, at this point, why it is helpful to understand canonical texts as 
metonyms for larger sets of associated concepts and principles.  I suggest that thinking of the 
canon this way allows us to place these texts within the class of argumentative terms that 
derive their meaning primarily from usage, when we might otherwise see them as among the 
smaller group of terms whose meaning is fixed by “rigid designation,”402 or, perhaps more 
loosely, what Wittgenstein calls “ostensive definition.”403  That is, without the concept of 
metonyms, it might seem perfectly appropriate to understand canonical texts as the 
argumentative analog of proper names: the reference is to a particular text in the world, and 
the meaning of the text—once established—remains ever the same.  When, however, we 
understand that the invocation of a canonical text does not point us to the text itself, but rather 
to a larger set of associated principles, it becomes easy to see how the text’s argumentative 
meaning derives from its correct use in discourse.   Further, it becomes plausible to suggest 
that—as a metonym—a text’s meaning is more susceptible to those evolutions in context, 
purpose, and application that alter our practices of rule following over time.  One could 
credibly argue, I think, that Wittgenstein’s contention that a word bears only a “family 
resemblance” to itself across a multiplicity of language-games already renders many words 
somewhat metonymic in nature,404 and the relation of word to meaning is made only more 
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abstract when—on top of this—a practitioner deliberately uses a term metonymically.  It is all 
of this play in the joints, I suggest, that makes the meaning of canonical texts particularly 
amenable to subtle and creative argumentation over time.405  And it is this possibility, this 
opening for individual impact over time, which I hope makes the idea of argumentative 
metonyms attractive to constitutional practitioners. 
Henri Bergson famously, and perhaps enigmatically, claimed that “[a]ction on the 
move creates its own route; creates to a very great extent the conditions under which is it to be 
fulfilled, and thus baffles all calculation.”406  While I might not go quite so far as Bergson, his 
thought does capture something essential about the nature of constitutional argument in 
general, and canonical metonyms in particular.  Part of the reason that normative interpretive 
theories fail—or are at least inadequate—is that there is something like a quantum effect at 
work in constitutional practice: the arguments themselves often alter the meaning of their 
constitutive parts.  Certainly, a successful argument can bring about a decision that seems to 
settle a particular question of disputed meanings; but even this stability exists for only a 
discrete contextual moment before questions of new application arise.   Moreover, and this is 
the critical point here, creative new arguments then employ these “settled” terms and texts in 
subtle new ways that slightly alter the rules of the game, and in the process change their 
meanings again over time.  Indeed, even an argument in support of a particular normative 
interpretive theory necessarily exerts some evolutionary influence on the very norms to which 
it appeals.  This is the inevitable uncertainty captured in Wittgenstein’s river of empiricism, 
and it is the ultimate reason that constitutional law remains less like a science and more like 
an art—that is, something to be described, but not explained. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Says About 'Original Meanings' 14-15, Working Paper available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1405451 (last 
visited May 25, 2009). 
405 Again, I should make clear that one cannot simply create new canonical meanings out of whole cloth.  Rather 
the practice is something like poetry, wherein the poet must use words in ways that are at least familiar enough 
that a reader can understand or ratify them.  But, to succeed, the poet must also push the boundaries of rule 
following.  See Bartrum, supra note 7, at 188-89 (discussing similar idea in the context of metaphors). 
406 HENRI BERGSON, THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 255-56 (Ruth A. Audra, Cloudesley 
Brereton, William H. Carter, trans., 1935). 
